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Introduction
We live in an unprecedented time for democracy.' The walls, political
and physical, that maintained communist authoritarianism in the former
Soviet Union have largely crumbled. 2 Peasant revolts throughout Mexico
have convinced the powers that be that it is time for the Mexican govern-
ment to loosen its hold on the country's political system and to cede
greater control to its citizens.3 The World Bank, once referred to as a
"lawless institution,"4 recently agreed to form an independent inspection
panel to receive and review citizens' complaints concerning its activities. 5
While threats to democratic principles, such as the rise of fascist hate
groups, still exist,6 democracy is highly contagious at this moment.
While it may seem self-evident, it bears repeating that democracy, and
the increasing recognition of democratic principles internationally,
advances the interests not only of the United States, but also of the world
community. The spread of democracy diminishes the opportunities for
international conflicts, thereby increasing international security and stabil-
ity.7 The spread of democracy is also in our economic interests--democ-
1. See Nicholas N. Kittrie, Democracy: An Institution Whose Time Has Come-From
Classical Greece to the Modern Pluralistic Society, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 375, 377
(1990) ("According to the reports of Freedom House in New York City, the largest
percentage ever of the world's population now lives under democracy.") (citing Freedom
in the World-1990, FREEDOM AT ISSUE, (Freedom House Report, New York, N.Y.) Jan.-
Feb. 1990). Moreover, "the Freedom House data (does not] measure the enormous
growth of prodemocracy sentiment in countries that are still far from being demo-
cratic." JOSHUA MURAVCHIK, EXPORTING DEMocPAc.v FULFILuNG AMERIcA's DErmNY 69
(1991).
2. See Michael Mandelbaum, Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union, FOREIGN
Arr., America and the World 1991/92, at 164.
3. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Mexican Government Is Moving To Open Up Presidential
Election, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1994, at A10.
4. Conversation with David Hunter, at the American University's Panel Discussion
on International Environmental Law (Sept. 19, 1993).
5. See The World Bank Inspection Pane International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, International Development Association, Res. No. 93-10, IDA Res. No.
IDA 93-6 (Sept. 23, 1993).
6. See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, Hate lliers Inflame Mayoral Race in New Orleans, N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 27, 1994, at A20; Alan Cowell, Italy's Far-Right Party: Is it Fascism with a
Human Face?, INT'L HERALD TmB., Apr. 1, 1994 available in LEXIS, News Library; How-
ard LaFranchi, Europeans Ponder Remedies for Intolerance, CHrusrN SCL MONrrOR, Mar. 9,
1994, at 1. While these groups represent the "ugly side" of democratic participation,
their views tend to threaten the very principles that allow for their expression.
7. Nations, like the United States, are founded upon moral, ethical principles con-
cerning the responsibilities of governments towards their citizens. When the actions of
others offend these principles we feel an ethical or moral imperative to act. Likewise,
other nations that hold different undemocratic beliefs feel the same imperative when
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racies make the best trading partners 8 This is so not only because
democracies promote a stable playing field for international business activ-
ity, but also because citizens in democracies are free to make consumer
choices. Moreover, to the extent that the spread of democracy causes
there to be fewer competing values to impose upon international eco-
nomic activity, the broader recognition of democratic principles can help
prevent value-based economic clashes.9 It is democracy's role in advanc-
U.S. actions conflict with their values. Nothing reflects the dangers inherent in clashes
between democratic values and nondemocratic values better than the Cold War. The
expansion of democracy internationally does have one negative effect on stability. the
conflicts that stem from the rise of nationalism. See, e.g., Michael Lind, In Defense of
Liberal Nationalism, FOREIGN Ai7., May-June 1994, at 87, 89-92 (discussing "stabilitarian"
school of thinking).
8. Much attention, however, has recently been focused on the economic success of
countries, particularly in Asia, where market reforms have proceeded apart from social
reforms-perestroika sans glasnost. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Culture Is Destiny: A Conver-
sation with Lee Kuan Yew, FOREIGN AFr., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 109, 109-26. Despite outward
signs of success many of these societies display hidden social fault lines that threaten
their economic and social well being. See, e.g., Richard Hornik, Bursting China's Bubble
FOREIGN ArF., May-June 1994, at 28, 29 ("China's government appears no more capable
of imposing fiscal and monetary discipline-the supposed advantage of authoritarian-
ism-than a corrupt democracy.").
9. Cf Clint N. Smith, International Trade in Television Programming and GATT An
Analysis of Wy the European Community's Local Program Requirement Violates the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw 97, 131 (1993) ("Since societies
on both sides of the Atlantic generally share conditions of developed democracies, a
GATT panel of impartial experts should rule that European moral standards are not so
distinct from American standards as to be threatened by U.S. television programs.").
The GATT/Tuna Dolphin case is perhaps the best example of how value system clashes
can cause economic conflicts. See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (GATT), BAsIc INsTRUMENTs AND SELEcrED Docu-
MENTs (BISD), 39th Supp. 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin Report]. If one
assumes, as many have, that the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act was based on a
moral, or Kantian, imperative to protect dolphins, then the entire dispute can be
revealed as an economic conflict driven by a clash of value systems. See Richard B.
Stewart, International Trade and the Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience; 49
WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 1329, 1360-61 (1992);Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment:
The False Conflict, in TRADE AND THE ENviRONMEN. LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 159,
165 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993). The U.S. moral imperative to protect dolphins,
when imposed on the trade system, conflicted with the Mexican system of values, which
shared no common imperative to protect these dolphins at the cost of the economic
activity. Although William Snape's article in this volume nimbly demonstrates that this
is a far too pedestrian analysis of this complex dispute, it cannot be denied that the
dispute was grounded, at least in part, in a clash of values. See WilliamJ. Snape, III &
Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searching for GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards"
Getting "Due Process?", 27 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 777 (1994). These reflections however,
should not in anyway be seen as disparaging ethically or morally driven trade policies.
See generally Robert F. Housman, A Kantian Approach to Trade and the Environment, 49
WASH. & LEE L. Rzv. 1373, 1373-88 (1992). Quite the contrary, often when the issues
that confront policy-makers are particularly difficult, ethical or moral beliefs are the
only obstacles to simply bad policies. Chester Bowles, Undersecretary of State during
the Kennedy administration, articulated this point in his analysis of that administration
in his private diary:
The question which concerns me most about this new Administration is
whether it lacks a genuine sense of conviction about what is right and what is
wrong....
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ing these vital interests that makes it so appealing internationally.
Yet, at a time when the democratic preachings of the developed world
seem to be having their greatest effect on the actions of developing and
transition nations, these same developed nations are rushing head first
into international trade agreements that offend the essential principles of
democracy. Part I of this article provides a definition of democracy as
applied here. Part II of this article discusses the undemocratic aspects of
international trade decision-making.
While these international trade agreements can provide a number of
important economic and other benefits, from a democracy perspective,
the continued strengthening of undemocratic international trade deci-
sion-making is troubling. Failures to democratize trade decision-making
are troubling because these failures squander an important opportunity to
further the recognition of democratic principles in undemocratic nations.
These democratic failures also undermine the role of democracy in
already democratic nations. Strengthening undemocratic trade decision-
making also serves as an obstacle to the wider development of democracy
within international relations, institutions, and law. Part III of this article
examines the negative effects of the undemocratic nature of international
trade decision-making.
The serious detrimental effects caused by the lack of democratic
processes in international trade decision-making require that the interna-
tional trade decision-making system must be "democratized." Part IV of
this article provides a prescription for democratizing the international
trading system while preserving the important benefits the system
provides.10
I. Defining Democracy
Because the word democracy means different things to different people,1 '
Anyone in public life who has strong convictions about the rights and wrongs of
public morality, both domestic and international, has a very great advantage in
times of strain, since his instincts on what to do are clear and immediate. Lack-
ing such a framework of moral conviction or sense of what is right and what is
wrong, he is forced to lean almost entirely upon his mental processes; he adds
up the pluses and minuses of any question and comes up with a conclusion.
Under normal conditions, when he is not tired or frustrated, the pragmatic
approach should successfully bring him out on the right side of the question.
What worries me are the conclusions such that an individual may reach when
he is tired, angry [or] frustrated....
DAVID HALBERsMm, THE BEsr AND THE BIGHTEsT 69 (1972) (quoting the diary of
Chester Bowles).
10. This article does not discuss the serious democratic flaws of trade decision-mak-
ing at the national level within the United States. For an excellent discussion of these
flaws and a well considered approach to rectifying them, see Patti Goldman, The Democ-
ratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 631 (1994).
11. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 2 (1987) ("The history of the idea of
democracy is complex and is marked by conflicting conceptions."). For example, the
word democracy can be expressed in such divergent ways as classical or liberal democ-
racy (which in turn can mean either protective democracy or developmental democ-
racy), or the Marxist concept of direct democracy, or such contemporary visions as
1994 Democratizing Decision-making
in order to describe the undemocratic nature of international trade deci-
sion-making, it is first necessary to define democracy in this context. In
the most simplistic sense, democracy means government by and for the
people. 12 However, because many of the elements of democratic govern-
ance at the national level (for example, the election of representatives in
free and fair elections) are inapplicable in the statially oriented world13 of
international trade decision-making,' 4 this article focuses more narrowly
on the element of democracy that is most applicable to international rela-
tions: the democratic right of citizens to have knowledge of and partici-
pate in decisions that will effect their interests.' 5 The idea of democracy
as discussed in this article is not one of representative democracy, but of
participatory democracy.
H. The Undemocratic Nature of International Trade Decision-making
A. Multilateral Trade Agreements
1. The GATT
The vast majority of international trade is currently conducted under the
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 6 To
pluralism, or elitist democracy. Id at 4. Real differences exist not only at the theoreti-
cal level (how should we define "democracy") but also at the operational level (how real
democracies work). AREND LUPHiART, DEMocRAcIEs: PAT'rERNs OF MAJORITARIAN AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE CouNTRuEs 37-222 (1984) (contrasting how 21
"democratic" nations operate).
12. See Kittrie, supra note 1, at 379.
13. For example, a great deal of dissension among democratic thinkers focuses on
what voting rights are necessary in a "democracy." Compare LIJPHART, supra note 11, at
18 (discussing voting in a "Westminster" model of democracy) with LuPHART, supra note
11, at 28 (discussing proportional representation).
14. SeeJOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OFJusTncE 377-82 (1971) (noting that while princi-
ples ofjustice that apply at the national level may be inapplicable at the international
level, the law of nations may require derivative principles based on these national prin-
ciples). While Rawls focuses on the rights of states in the international system, his
reflections are in many ways equally applicable to the relationship between states and
individuals in international affairs.
15. See generally CAROLE PATEmAN, PARTICIPATION AND DFsMocRATc THEORY (1970)
(discussing participatory elements of democracy). This narrow focus should not be
seen as prejudicing debate over the potential applicability of other elements of democ-
racy to international affairs generally or international trade decision-making particu-
larly. Depending on the interest at stake, participation here may be direct or indirect.
In many instances this narrow definition will, in practice, allow participation by inter-
est groups (e.g., environment, labor, human rights, and business) in principle. The fact
that interest groups may represent their constituents does not, however, diminish the
fact that the right to participate is at the individual level.
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, as amended, Basic
Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. IV, 61 Stat. (pt. 5), T.JA.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT]. The GATT has never been formally ratified by the
United States Senate. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SysTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35 (1989). Instead, the United States
and seven other nations agreed through the Protocol of Provisional Application, an
executive agreement, to provisionally apply the GATT "on and after 1 January 1948."
Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 6), at A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308; Proclamation No. 2761A
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understand why the GAT is not currently democratic it is necessary to
have an understanding about the agreement's genesis.
The trade negotiations that led to the GATT's creation were in actual-
ity a series of three somewhat distinct sets of negotiations that were
intended ultimately to form a package deal under the auspices of the
International Trade Organization (ITO).17 The first part of these negotia-
tions involved the drafting of a multilateral tariff reduction treaty.18 The
second part dealt with the establishment of general obligations relating to
tariffs.19 Together these first two parts were the GATT. 20 The third part
dealt with establishing an international institutional structure for trade
decision-making: the ITO.2' The GATT itself was conceived of as merely
a treaty and not as having even the "suggestion of an organization."22 In
fact, the GATT contained a clause recognizing the ITO.2 3
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played a role in the negotia-
tions that crafted the ITO Charter. For example, during the ITO negotia-
tions public hearings were held in the United States to assist the
government in formulating its positions.24 Additionally, representatives
from NGOs participated in the Havana Conference negotiations, the final
ITO negotiation that dealt with issues about the composition of and par-
ticipation in the Charter.25
The final ITO Charter reflects the more participatory character of the
negotiations that lead to its drafting. Unlike the GAIT, which provides no
role for NGOs, the preceding ITO Charter explicitly provided that the
ITO was to "make suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation
with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters within the
scope of this Charter."2 6 Indeed, the Annex to the ITO Charter went so
(Carrying Out General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Concluded at Geneva, October
30, 1947] [sic], 12 Fed. Reg. 8863 (1947); JACKSON, supra, at 34-35.
17. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 32.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. For excellent historical discussions of the ITO's development, see CLAIR
WiLcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 37-52 (1949);JACxsoN, supra note 16, at 32-37.
22. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 33.
23. Id.
24. William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, in ESSAYS IN INTEXATIONAL FINANCE 19
(International Finance Section of the Department od Economics and Social Institutions
in Princeton University, ed., No. 16, Oct. 1952).
25. See Norman Bums, The Amefican Farmer and the ITO Charte, 20 DEP'T ST. BOLL.
215, 219-20 ("Representatives of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National
Grange, and the National Council of Farm Cooperatives served as advisers in the U.S.
Delegation during the Havana conference in 1947-1948."); Diebold, supra note 24 (A
Havana Conference representative of the National Association of Manufacturers com-
mented that the article in ITO on foreign investment, offers foreign investors greater
protection than they ever had previously against unjust, arbitrary acts by government.).
For a discussion of the negotiations during the Havana Conference, see WILcox, supra
note 21, at 45-53.
26. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 1948, art.
87.2, reprinted in HAvANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION AND
FnAL ACr AND RELATED DOCUMENTs (Department of State ed., 1947). Such a provision
VoL 27
1994 Democratizing Decision-making
far as to provide that the Commission established under the Charter
would be responsible for "... prepar[ingi, in consultation with non-gov-
ernmental organizations, for presentation to the first regular session of
the Conference recommendations regarding the implementation of the
provisions [concerning the participation of nongovernmental organiza-
tions within the ITO]." 27 Thus, NGOs were not only supposed to play a
role in the ITO, they were also supposed to help decide what that role
should be.
While the ITO Charter was being negotiated, a number of parties
desired to speed the application of the GATT tariff related parts of the
package.2 8 In order to do this, eight parties developed the Protocol of
Provisional Application, an agreement committing these parties to apply
provisionally the GATT as of January 1, 1948.29
Although the Havana Conference of 1948 completed the ITO Char-
ter, the ITO never came into being.30 This failure was caused in great
measure by the United States Congress' refusal to approve the treaty.3 1
With the failure of the ITO, the GATT, although not intended as an insti-
tution, stepped in to fill the vacuum.3 2
Thus, from a historical perspective, it seems likely that the GATT's
failure to provide more democratic procedures is the result of mere over-
sight. Because the GATT was never intended to function as an institution,
policy choices as to the make up of the GATT as an institution were never
addressed; public participation and transparency were not provided
because they were matters for the Havana negotiations of the ITO, not in
the Geneva GAIT negotiations. When the ITO failed, the institutional
decisions that were made in its Charter, such as public participation, inad-
vertently rolled with the ITO-GATT's severed head.
Even assuming that the GAT's failure to incorporate the ITO provi-
sions on public participation was an oversight, the ITO provisions on pub-
lic participation, though greater than the GAT's, were themselves rather
limited. The failure of the GAT (and the ITO) to adopt more demo-
cratic procedures is a reflection of the period surrounding its creation.
Conceived in 1947, the GAT is a product of the post-World War II drive
for economic stability and military security through the mutual depen-
dence of nations, 33 traditional notions of state sovereignty, and the ideolo-
has recently been resurrected in the Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round. See infra
note 78.
27. Resolutions Adopted by the Conference, Resolution Establishing an Interim
Commission for the International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on Trade and
Employment, Annex, art. 2(e), rprinted in HAvANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORoizA.riON AND FINAL Aar AND RErATE Docuhmrrs, supra note 26, at 71.
28. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 34.
29. See Protocol of Provisional Application of the GAIT, supra note 16; see a/soJACK-
SON, supra note 16, at 35-37.
30. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 34.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 37.
33. See id. at 30-31.
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gies of the then emerging Cold War.3 4
At the time of the GATT's conception there was little reason to
believe that individuals or NGOs would need to participate in interna-
tional trade decision-making. By 1947, with the singular exception of the
International Labor Organization (ILO),35 the Grotian concept of the sov-
ereign nation-state singularly dominated international affairs.3 6 Although
"tremors shaking the foundations of sovereignty, were felt, at least among
scholars, prior to World War II,"37 in the aftermath of the war, interna-
tional law and institutions remained firmly the province of nation-states.
The primacy of nation-states continued through the second World
War and it remained the dominant force in international relations at the
34. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text (discussing the historical underpin-
nings of GATT's antidemocratic traditions).
35. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted a dramatically more par-
ticipatory model for international institutions. Labor, employers, and national govern-
ments all participated in the negotiations leading up to the ILO's creation. See
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFCE, TRnE UNIONS AND THE ILO: A WORKER'S EDUCATION
MANUAL 5 (1979). In addition, the ILO's Constitution adopts a far more participatory
structure than that included in the GATT. Under the ILO Constitution the representa-
tives of nongovernmental organizations serve as members of each parties' delegation.
International Labour Office, Constitution of the International Labor Organization and
Standing Orders of the International Labour Conference, 1969, art. 56.1. As delegates
these individuals have the same rights as delegates from the governments of member
states (e.g., the right to make statements and vote). Id. arts. 57.9, 15.10, 3.1. 3.2, 3.5,
4.1,, 4.2. Even nongovernmental organizations which are not members of a delegation
may serve as advisors to the ILO. Moreover, NGOs can also bring complaints to the
ILO as to certain labor practices of a party. The ILO, however, was created well prior to
the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, its creation was free
from the constraints of the Cold War era. The ILO may be somewhat of a democratic
outlier in the world of international institutions because of the inherently nongovern-
mental nature of the problems it addresses.
36. The dominant role of nation states in international affairs is commonly traced
to the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius. See HUGO GRoTIus, PROLEGMENA
TO THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE paras. 14-17 (F. Kelsey trans. 1957); Ali Khan, The Extinc-
lion of Nation-States, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 197, 202-210 (1992). The Treaty of
Westphalia ending the Thirty Years War enshrined Grotius' theories into practice by
creating a Europe of nation states. See id. at 205. Over the course of the ensuing centu-
ries the Grotian tradition came to dominate public and private international law and
institutions. See M. McDoucAL & W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE 1295 (1981); PHILLIP ALLorr, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD
249 (1990) ("The misconceiving of international society as a system of closed sovereign-
ties, externalized state-systems, undemocratized and unsocialized, spread throughout
the world.").
Under the Grotian concept of international law and relations, the individual is the
"object," not the "subject." Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Door, 1993 Wis.
L. REv. 965, 1004 (1993); Atior, supra, at 245 ("All interacting of persons and socie-
ties other than the state-societies and their governments is conceived as being outside
the vestigial social process of the interstatal unsociety."). Thus, the individual may be
acted upon by the international affairs conducted by nation states, but he or she may
not act in these dealings. See Scaperlanda, supra.
37. See Scaperlanda, supra note 36, at 1010 n.225, citing CHARIES FENWICK, INrm-A
TIoNAL LAw 60 (2d ed. 1934) ("[A] number of scholars have come to the belief that a
new theory of international relations is needed, that the old emphasis upon 'sover-
eignty' must give way to a more realistic acceptance of the actual interdependence of
nations....").
Vol. 27
1994 Democratizing Decision-making
middle of the century. The strongest evidence of the primacy of nation-
states in international affairs during this period is the 1945 Charter of the
United Nations.3 8 For example, the Charter limits membership, and
therein the actors who can partake in international affairs conducted
under U.N. auspices, to recognized nations.3 9 Thus, it is not surprising
that the GATT agreement of 1947 similarly follows the Grotian tradition
and excludes both individuals and NGOs.
Moreover, at the time of the GATr's conception there was little impe-
tus to challenge these notions of national sovereignty and the preemi-
nence of nation-states in international affairs. Democratic nations were
far fewer in number than they are today.40 Further, even within existing
democracies, the reach of citizens' rights was still being developed. For
example, in the United States, the original Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) was signed into law only 16 months prior to the GATT's creation.4 1
The publication of the Attorney General's Manual, which to this day
remains the principle guide to the APA, only pre-dates the GATT by 64
days.42 At the time of the GATT's creation, the most democratic of
nations were still attempting to find the right balance for citizens' involve-
ment in even purely domestic affairs.
At that time even industries, the principal actors in international
trade, were not perceived as needing a major independent voice in inter-
national trade decision-making. International trade was far more limited
at that time then it is now,43 so international trade decisions were of less
importance than they are today. Additionally, in 1947, industries were
largely national, as opposed to multinational. The needs of these national
industries tended to coincide with the needs of their home country.44
"Engine Charlie" Wilson summed up this view when he proclaimed that
38. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 4 (goal of harmonizing the actions of
nations); art. 4, para. 1 (membership made up of nations). The Grotian statial world of
international relations has, however, come under attack beginning largely in the 1960s.
See A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of Inter-
nationalEnvironmental Law, 68 CHi.-KFtcr L. REv. 61, 67-68 (1992) (discussing writings of
McDougal and Friedman); see also WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1964).
39. See U.N. CHARTaR art. 4, para. 1 (membership made up of nations).
40. See Kittrie, supra note 1, at 377.
41. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988); (origi-
nally enacted Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237, Ch. 324 §§ 1-12, (June 11, 1946), repealed
and amended Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (Sept. 6, 1966)); see also ADMINISTRAaTvE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SouRcEBooK:
STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIALS 1-3 (2d ed. 1992).
42. See United States Department ofJustice, Attorney General's Manual on the APA
(Aug. 27, 1947), reprinted in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOoKa STAT-
UTES AND RELATED MATERIALS, supra note 40, at 67-139.
43. See ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 63 (1991) ("America at midcentury
was not a major trading nation .... Even by 1960, only 4 percent of the cars Americans
purchased were built outside of the United States ...
44. See id. at 46. Reich provides:
At [the American economy's] core stood about five hundred major corpora-
tions which, by midcentury, produced about half of the nation's industrial out-
put . . . owned roughly three-quarters of the nation's industrial assets,
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"what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice
versa."45 In this world of 1947, citizens felt their governments knew what
was in their best interests domestically and internationally.
Additionally, a greater role for citizens in the international institu-
tions of 1947 cut against emerging Cold War ideologies.46 The Cold War
provided substantial justification for limiting citizens' access to interna-
tional negotiations and deliberations; these were areas firmly within the
secretive realm of national security interests and were not for public
consumption. 47
Thus, the undemocratic GATT of today is rooted in the circumstances
surrounding its creation in 1947. Since its creation in 1947, the GATT has
not adapted to or accommodated the sweeping democratic changes that
have in the interim fundamentally altered the world.48
Although in this regard the GATr's procedures and practices have
been unchanged largely since 1947, historically little was made of their
democratic shortcomings. As noted above, industry, the core constituent
accounted for about 40 percent of the nation's corporate profits, and employed
more than one out of eight of the nation's nonfarm workers.
Id. Reich goes on to state that these corporations "were the champions of the national
economy; their success were its successes. They were the American economy." Id. at 47.
45. See Nomination of Charles Wilson for Secretary of Defense Before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953), as reported in N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 24, 1953, at 8;
REicH, supra note 43, at 119. The globalization of economic activities in general and
corporations in particular has largely delinked the interests of nations from the inter-
ests of specific multi-national corporations that hail from within their borders. Id. at
119-53.
46. See LOCH V_ JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNA IONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS
CoNrONTs THE ExEcuTrrvE 8 n.13 (1984) (noting 1946 as the start date for the Cold
War).
47. Cf Scaperlanda, supra note 36, at 1011. The demise of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights exemplifies how Cold War ideologies limited individual rights in
international institutions and law. Id. The Universal Declaration, drafted by the Com-
mission on Human Rights, was conceived of as a focal point for the further develop-
ment of new internationalized norms of human rights. Id. The advent of the Cold War,
however, caused the issue of a binding covenant on human rights to become caught up
in the polarized struggles between the free and communist worlds. Id. Once the Uni-
versal Declaration got caught up in the ideological struggles of the day its potential for
success ended. Id. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A,
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
48. Certainly the same criticism can be levied against a host of other international
institutions, particularly the United Nations, which are, in most instances, similarly
undemocratic. The GATT differs from these institutions, however, in that the GATT is
more vulnerable to democratic challenge because of the nature of its endeavours. First,
unlike international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
GAIT deals with matters that affect the day-to--day affairs of virtually every person,
are inherently commercial or private, and that increasingly impinge on areas, such as
local police powers, that have generally been outside the province of international
aff-airs. Even when compared with other international organizations, such as the World
Health Organization or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
which appear to have similar characteristics, one other important difference must be
recognized: these other institutions facilitate the development of policies, but the
GATT actually makes binding policies for its member states.
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of trade rules, felt comfortable with the GATr system.4 9 The public, as
consumers, have, until late, paid little attention to the GAT1.50 Labor,
which has long dealt with trade-related issues, has been generally unable
to substantively advance its issues at GATT, making procedural issues
secondary.5 1
Attention to GATT democracy issues really only began with the
advent of the trade and environment debate.52 In 1992, a GATT dispute
panel was convened to hear a complaint by Mexico that the application of
U.S. law designed to protect dolphin in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
to Mexican tuna and tuna products exported to the United States were in
violation of the U.S. obligations under the GATT. 53 The panel's decision,
which was never adopted, that the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act
violated the rules of the GATIT, touched off a furor around the globe, and
in particular in the U.S. environmental community.5 4 In response to this
decision, the U.S. environmental community embarked on an ongoing
crusade to reform the GATT to make it more environmentally sustaina-
ble.55 These environmental reform efforts quickly spread beyond the
United States.5 6
Environmentalists involved in GATT reform efforts realized early on
that their work was being stymied by the GATr's procedural rules. Thus,
democratic reforms of the GATT became a critical issue to environmental-
49. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing industry and trade
history).
50. See, e.g., Walter Russell Mead, Bushism, Found, HARPE"'S, Sept. 1992, at 37 ("The
average reader sees the acronym GATT, followed, say, by a reference to the European
Community or the Group of Seven industrial nations, and soon the eyes begin to glaze
and a hand reaches mechanically to turn the page.").
51. Cf. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World
Trading Regime, 126 ITr'L LAB. REv. 565, 574-75 (1985) (discussing long-term efforts to
raise labor issues in GATr).
52. For a general discussion of the trade and environment debate, see DURWOOD
ZAEtKE ET AL., TRADE AND THE ENWRONMr.: LAw, EcoNoMics AND Poucy (1993).
53. Tuna Dolphin Report; supra note 9. For additional discussion about the tuna/
dolphin decision, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of
the Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect, 49 WASH. & LaE L. REv. 1407, 1409-22
(1992); Thomas E. Skilton, Note, GA7T and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-
Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation Strategy, 26 CoRNEM INT'L
L.J. 455 (1993); Robert F. Housman & DurwoodJ. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environ-
ment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 Evst. L. RaP. 10268 (1992).
54. Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling: Trade Pact Imperils Environmental
Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at Dl.
55. See, e.g., Impacts of Trade Agreements on U.S. Environmental Protection and Natural
Resource Conservation Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural
Resources of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24
(1993) (statement ofJohn Audley, Trade Analyst, Sierra Club); The Environmental Impli-
cations of the Uruguay Round of GAT: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Economic Policy,
Trade and Environment, of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994),
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File (statement of Alex Hittie, International
Coordinator, Friends of the Earth).
56. See, e.g., Environmental News Network, GAIT: The Environment and the Third
World (undated); Charles Arden-Clarke, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, June 1991 (World Wildlife
Fund-Europe paper).
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ists. As environmentalists increasingly focused on changing the GATT's
antidemocratic procedures, advocates for other areas of social policy, such
as human rights and labor, also began to focus more heavily on the GATT
and democracy issues.5 7 Interestingly, many business interests and "GAT-
Tologists," often times perceived as the GATT's natural constituency,
joined this call for democratic reforms of the GATT.5 8 Like those who
seek to advance a social agenda, these economically interested parties are
similarly concerned that the GATT's closed processes can at times under-
mine their interests. GATT supporters in favor of democratic reforms fear
that the GATT's failure to follow corrent democratic trends may ultimately
undermine the legitimacy of the international trading systems.
2. The GATT's Relevant Provisions and Policies
The GATT is an agreement among member nation-states, 5 9 which fully
embraces traditional notions of sovereignty in international affairs. As
such, the GATT's policies and practices afford citizens with virtually no
democratic rights of direct participation.6 0 Although the GATT agree-
ment itself is silent on secrecy, official GATT meetings are conducted in
secret.6 ' No record or transcript of these meetings or negotiations are
made public. The vast majority of GAIT created documents, and member
state documents created for GAIT activities, are classified and cannot be
obtained by the general public.62 When the GAIT does declassify a docu-
ment, it does so at a glacial pace rendering most of these declassified doc-
uments outdated and of little value to anyone but GATT history scholars.
The secretive nature of GAIT negotiations and discussions is particu-
larly disconcerting when one considers the types of issues the GAIT
addresses. Although the resolution of trade disputes has always been in
57. See e.g., Martin Khor Koh Peng, GATT Threatens Third World Sovereignty, EARTH
IsLANDJ., Winter 1992, at 30, 30-31 (Mr. Peng is Director of the Consumers' Association
of Penang).
58. See e.g., Robert J. Morris, A Business Perspective on Trade and the Environment, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 9, at 121, 129-30 (Mr. Morris is the Washing-
ton Representative of the United States Council for International Business); John H.
Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, in TRADE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 9, at 219, 230-32 (Mr.Jackson is one of the foremost
authorities on GATT).
59. GAIT does not limit membership to "sovereign nations." SeeJAcxsoN, supra
note 16, at 46. Separate customs territories that are autonomous in their external rela-
tions can become contracting parties. Id. National independence movements have,
however, converted the vast majority of non-independent customs territories into sover-
eign states, and so for all practical purposes the GAIT is an agreement among nation-
states.
60. Kantor Rejects Call for GATT Moratorium on Environmental Disputes, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 4, 1994, at 3, 4 ("'There is no transparency in the processes that surround
the GAIT today .... '") (quoting the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Mickey
Kantor). The GATT is among the best international institutions with regard to repre-
sentative democracy, as each nation holds one equal vote.
61. Cf Jackson, supra note 58, at 231 ("GATT tends too often to try to operate in
secrecy, attempting to avoid public and news media accounts of its actions.").
62. Id. (Professor Jackson calls this a "charade" because many of these documents
leak out almost immediately anyway).
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the GATT's portfolio, in its earlier days most of the GATT's time was spent
discussing tariff reductions. Today, however, tariff reduction negotiations
are just one of many wide ranging issues discussed. Other GATT discus-
sions of late have focused, either directly or indirectly, on: (1) environ-
mental policy;6 3 (2) tax policy;64 (3) labor policy;65 (4) antitrust policy;66
and (5) cultural policy.67 The concern here is not that the GATT is dis-
cussing the inter-relationships between these areas of domestic policy and
international trade. Rather, the GATT is essentially determining the valid-
ity of vital domestic policies in an undemocratic manner.
The application of these ironclad rules of secrecy is perhaps most
troubling in the area of GATT dispute resolution. The GATT dispute reso-
lution procedures which review national laws are notoriously undemo-
cratic. 68 Ambassador Kantor, the United States Trade Representative,
called GATT panels "star chambers."6 9 Citizens whose laws are being chal-
lenged may have no knowledge of that fact. Neither the GATT nor the
parties are required to provide notice of disputes to the general public.
The hearings of a GATT dispute panel and the pleadings are closed to all
but the involved parties.70 Moreover, citizens may be denied access to the
final decisions of dispute panels. 71 Individual citizens or NGOs who have
a personal stake in the outcome may neither appear before the panel
hearing a dispute, nor independently submit information to that panel.
7 2
While there is nothing to prevent a party from releasing its own pleadings,
it cannot, without permission of the other party or parties, either release
their pleadings or make their arguments public.
63. See, e.g., GATT Trade and Environment Subcommittee Sets Workplan for Fall INSIDE
U.S. TRADE,July 15, 1994, at 22; GATT Argues Over Response to Earth Summit on Trade and
Environment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 30, 1992, at 1, 16.
64. See, e.g., U.S. Seeks Derogation From Services Framework Tax Provision, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Oct. 29, 1993, at 1, 19.
65. See, e.g., Kantor Links Trade to Labor Rights, But Questions French Approach, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Mar. 25, 1994, at 8-11; U.S. Concedes on Foreign Workers to Boast Financial
Services Offer, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 10, 1993, at 1, 18.
66. See, e.g., New Steel Report Shows U.S. Focus on Anticompetitive Practices, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 10, 1993, at S1, S8-9.
67. See, e.g., EC Spells Out its Goals For Uruguay Round Audiovisual Talks, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Oct. 15, 1993, at 1, 17-19.
68. See Kantor Rejects Call for GA7T Moratorium on Environmental Disputes, supra note
60, at 4 ("'[N]o one knows what those decisions are, what the basis was, who is making
the decision, how they're being made, what pieces of paper we'll put in front of
them.'") (quoting Ambassador Kantor).
69. Id. Steve Charnovitz, Trade Negotiations and the Environmen Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 144, 147 (Mar. 11, 1992).
70. The Texts of the Tokyo Round Agreements, Understanding Regarding Notification, Con-
sultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance Annex (Agreed Description of the Custom-
ary Practice of GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2)), para. iv,
GAIT, Doc. L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979), reprinted in GATT, THE TEXTS oF THE Toxvo
ROUND AGREEMENTS 205, 207 (1986).
71. SeeJackson, supra note 58, at 231-32. Decisions are typically derestricted once
they are adopted. However, the delay between a decision and its adoption seriously
prejudices the interest of citizens. See Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147.
72. See Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147; supra note 71 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the confidentiality of pleadings in disputes).
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In practice, the only party that has made its submissions public is the
United States-and it originally only did so begrudgingly. 7a However, in
order to not compromise the arguments of contesting parties, the United
States has had to redact substantially the briefs it has provided to the pub-
lic, making them relatively worthless.74 Reading these briefs has been
equated with "reading a baseball scorecard that only lists the performance
of one of the two teams; there is no way to know who is playing and how
the game is going."75
These undemocratic dispute resolution processes can have very real
effects on the national laws theyjudge. While a GATT dispute panel can-
not actually overturn a party's laws, or force a party to change its laws, a
challenged party whose law violates the GATT must provide offsetting con-
cessions or be subject to substantial penalties in the form of countervailing
duties.76 The costs of these concessions or penalties can be so great as to
encourage, or in the eyes of others coerce, a losing party into changing its
laws to make them consistent with the GATT.77
3. The Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round
The product of roughly seven years of exhaustive efforts, the currently pro-
posed Final Agreement of the Uruguay Round of the GATT (the Final
Agreement) would replace the existing GAT.78 In replacing the existing
GAT, the Final Agreement would substantially strengthen and amend
the current GAIT rules, as well as providing a long awaited international
organization to oversee the conduct of international trade-the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
73. See Trade and the Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
49, 51, 52-62 (1994) (statement of Robert F. Housman, Staff Attorney, The Center for
International Environmental Law, on behalf of the Sierra Club and Defenders of Wild-
life) [hereinafter Housman Testimony of Feb. 3, 1994]. At first, the United States only
released its briefs under great pressure. Under the Clinton administration the United
States has seemed more willing to do so.
74. Id. For example, the public version of the U.S. brief in Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards GATT Challenge begins:
"5.[
] As addressed below, there is no support in the General Agreement for this
theory."
See Second Submission of the United States to the Panel on United States-Taxes on
Automobiles (Nov. 24, 1993) (public version) at 2 (brackets and blank spaces in the
original) (on file with author).
75. See Housman Testimony of Feb. 3, 1994, supra note 73, at 53.
76. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution, Participation, and the "Greening" of Interna-
tional Trade Law, 7J. ENvTL. L & LIT. 57, 95 (1992).
77. See USTR, THE GAT URUGUAY RouND AGREEMENTS: REPORT ON ENVIRONMEN.
TAL. IssuEs 58-59 (1994).
78. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations [hereinafter Final Agreement], GAT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9
(1994), reprinted in OFFICE or THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL Aar EMBODYING
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION
OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
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Unfortunately, the furor raging over the GATT's undemocratic ways
during the last two years of negotiation of the Uruguay Round had virtu-
ally no effect on the Final Agreement. Democratic improvements to the
current GATT decision-making processes are not generally among the
Final Agreement's ambitious program of reforms.
4. The Relevant Provisions and Policies of the Final Agreement
While the Uruguay Round did not generally deal with democratic
improvements, article V.2 of the Final Agreement's Agreement Establish-
ing the WTO does take a small step forward in improving the potential for
more democratic GATT procedures and practices. Article V.2 provides
that the WTO "may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and
cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters
related to those of the WTO."79 This provision, which resurrects the simi-
lar provision in the failed ITO charter,8 0 may provide a mechanism for
encouraging greater democracy within WTO decision-making than had
been the tradition in the GATT.
Apart from this resurrected provision for consultations, the Final
Agreement changes little. Under the terms of the Final Agreement, GATI
meetings will still be conducted in secret, and no record or transcript of
these meetings for the general public is required.81 Thus, it is likely that
documents produced by the WTO or by the parties for future GATT meet-
ings will also remain classified. Proof of this can be found in the top line
of the December 15 Final Agreement, which reads: "Restricted."8 2
The Final Agreement also largely carries over GATT's undemocratic
ways in the troubling area of dispute settlement. Under the Final Agree-
ment, the hearings of dispute panels and of the newly created appellate
body will proceed in secret; citizens may not attend.8 3 Citizens and NGOs
are also precluded from appearing before, or independently providing
information to panels.8 4 Whereas in the past the inability of citizens to
79. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATr Doc. MTN/FA II, art.
V.2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], in Final Agreement, id.
80. See supra note 26 (discussing article 87.2 of the Havana Charter).
81. Although, the Final Agreement is silent as to whether meetings will be closed,
secrecy is likely to continue out of default and tradition. A combination of several of
the Agreement's provisions seems to reflect this likelihood. Article IV.1 of the Agree-
ment establishing the World Trade Organization (WrO), provides that the WTO is
composed of only representatives of the parties. See WTO Agreement, supra note 79, art.
IV.1. Article IX provides that WTO decisions will be taken at meetings of the parties:
Id. art. IX.1-.5. Article V provides as to NGOs that the WTO may only "make appropri-
ate arrangements for consultation and cooperation .... " Id. art. V.2.
82. Final Agreement supra note 78, at 1.
83. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Goveming the Settlement of Disputes, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II-A2, app. 3, para. 2 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Dispute Understanding],
in FinalAgreement; supra note 78 ("The panel will meet in closed session. The parties to
the dispute, or other in parties, will be present at the meetings only when invited by the
panel to appear before it."). See also Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147.
84. Dispute Understanding, supra note 83, § 12.6 (submissions), app. 3, para. 2
(appearances). Panels may, however, request information from private parties. Id.
§ 13.1. See also Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147.
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participate arose out of bureaucratic fiat, the Final Agreement's incorpo-
ration of these customs disturbingly serves to legalize them. The Final
Agreement is silent as to whether the public may have access to the reports
of dispute panels and the appellate body. In the face of the Final Agree-
ment's failure to alter expressly the status quo and require that these
reports be made public, it is unlikely the public will gain access to the
decisions in GATT disputes.
While the Final Agreement generally follows the GATT's undemo-
cratic habits, two of its provisions go well beyond the GATT's in diminish-
ing the role of the public. First, the Final Agreement provides a
mechanism for the further evolution of the GATT through ongoing nego-
tiations in standing committees.85 These committees are empowered to
develop changes to the GAIT, which may be adopted by the parties, in
many instances by a mere two-thirds vote.8 6 In the United States, the need
for the President to obtain approval from Congress to enter into a new
negotiating round has provided the public with one of its most important
leverage points for participation. At the time of this writing it is unclear
how this new system of ongoing negotiations will be reconciled with the
requirement of congressionally approved negotiating authority. If this
new system replaces the current incremental system of congressional
approval with longer-term or ongoing grants of authority, the Final Agree-
ment will significantly diminish public access into international trade deci-
sion-making.8 7 It is possible, however, that these ongoing negotiations will
be grouped into cross-sectional, round-like closing negotiations.8 8 Pre-
sumably, these closings would require the President to obtain congres-
sional authority to participate in them and congressional approval for
their results to enter into law.
Alternatively, these new negotiating procedures could, however,
prove to be an asset to those who seek democratic reform of the GATT. If
the GATT parties decide to provide greater democratic rights in GAIT
procedures, these new procedures will facilitate the enactment of the nec-
essary changes to the GATT rules. Unfortunately, given the current
85. WTO Agreement, supra note 79, art. X.
86. Id. art. X, §§ 3-5.
87. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Polic, 18 BRooV.J.
INT'L L. 143, 166-69 (1992). Professor Koh states:
The Fast Track critics' most persuasive critique is of the President's tactic of
bundling disparate trade proposals, both within the NAFTA, and between the
NAFI'A and the Uruguay Round and placing them before Congress for a single
vote. Taken to extremes, they argue, bundling makes it too painful for Con-
gress to vote against a completed trade accord, in much the same way that the
bundling of many appropriations bill[s] into a single continuing resolution vir-
tually immunizes such a resolution against a presidential veto. For that reason,
opponents muster policy arguments against the Fast Track similar to those mus-
tered by advocates of a presidential line-item veto.
Id. at 168 (emphasis in the original, citations omitted).
88. This is the more likely option because individual sector negotiations may lack
both the political will and the cross-sectional ability to make trade-offs that have allowed
GAIT rounds to succeed to date. This system is also appealing because it provides a
distinct, or somewhat distinct, beginning and end.
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undemocratic nature of the GATT, and the GATT's persistent refusal to
even consider democratic reforms, the ability to alter easily GATT rules
seems more likely to be used to undermine democracy rather than to
advance it.
The second provision of the Final Agreement that impairs the demo-
cratic rights of citizens deals with the remedies available to a prevailing
party in a post-Uruguay Round dispute. Under the existing GAT? a chal-
lenged party cannot be forced to change its laws; dispute panels may
merely recommend such changes.8 9 Most trade disputes end in a negoti-
ated settlement. However, if such a settlement cannot be reached, the
prevailing party's only recourse is to request permission to take retaliatory
measures. 90 While parties have retaliated without authorization, they do
so in violation of the GAT]. 9 1 Approvals for retaliatory measures are
rarely granted.9 2 All this, however, will change under the Final Agree-
ment. Under the Final Agreement, if a losing party fails to make its prac-
tices or laws GATT-consistent and the winning party elects to move
forward, the losing party must pay mutually acceptable compensation or
face GATT-authorized retaliation.93
The one somewhat positive change included in the Final Agreement
pertains to the pleadings of the parties in disputes. Under the Final
Agreement, a party to a dispute may request that another make a copy of
its brief or a summary of its arguments public.94 While this is a step in the
right direction, its length is arguably quite short. By allowing a party to
substitute a summary of its brief in place of its actual brief, the Final Agree-
ment invites abuse. 95 It is likely that the parties, which have to date shown
no willingness (with the exception of the United States) to democratize
GATT disputes in general, or release briefs in particular, will provide sum-
maries in place of their briefs. The potential reliance on summaries for
compliance with article 18.2 of the Final Agreement raises serious con-
cerns with respect to the comprehensiveness of the information the public
will be able to obtain through this process. The lack of any substantive
requirements as to what constitutes a bona fide summary may create a
loophole that will swallow the rule.9 6
89. See Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 76, at 95.
90. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 76, at 95.
91. See Charnovitz, supra note 69, at 147.
92. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 76, at 95.
93. Dispute Understanding, supra note 83, § 22.2. See generally Charnovitz, supra note
69, at 147. The GATT, under the Final Agreement, does not itself impose a sanction; it
authorizes the winning party to do so if it so elects. Dispute Understanding, supra note 83,
§ 22.2.
94. Dispute Understanding, supra note 83, § 18.2, app. 3, para. 3.
95. See Housman Testimony of Feb. 3, 1994, supra note 73, at 3.
96. Id. at 3-4. Under the U.S. Pelosi Amendment, nations seeking a loan from a
multilateral development bank must make public a summary of an environmental
assessment for the loan activities 120 days prior to the vote on the loan. 22 U.S.C.
§ 262m-7(a) (Supp. V 1993). If a loan applicant fails to meet this requirement the
United States Executive Director to the respective multilateral development bank is for-
bidden by law from voting in favor of the loan. Id. The Pelosi Amendment, like the
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B. Other International Institutions
Although the GATT is the principal body of international trade decision-
making, two international organizations also play major roles in setting the
stage for GATT decisions: the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and the Codex Alimentarius Commission
(Codex). 9 7 Like the GATT, both the OECD and Codex also exhibit
undemocratic characteristics.
1. The OECD
In the area of international trade the OECD serves as a coordinating body
to allow its developed-nation membership to forge unified positions that
can then be advanced through the GATT. Because the trade policies for-
mulated at the OECD have a major bearing on the direction that GATT
policies will ultimately take, the inability of the public to have access to
and participate in the policy-making processes of the OECD is most
disturbing.
Like the GATT, OECD documents are restricted unless the OECD
decides to derestrict them.9 8 These restrictions on documents prevent the
public from tracking the development of the OECD's policies, which in
turn diminishes the public's ability to influence international trade deci-
sion-making. Additionally, this OECD classification system is as puzzling
as it is troubling. For example, while some OECD documents are negotiat-
Final Agreement's provision on the use of summaries of briefs, provides no standard for
objectively determining what level and type of information must be provided in order
for a summary to be bona fide. Compare id. with Dispute Understanding, supra note 83,
§ 18.2, app. 3, para. 3. "The summaries that have been produced under the Pelosi
Amendment for multi-million dollar mega-projects are often times little more than a
page or two in length." Housman Testimony of Feb. 3, 1994, supra note 73, at 4.
Although the Pelosi Amendment remains an important tool for environmental protec-
tion and democracy, this loophole has markedly diminished its potential for advancing
these causes. There is "no reason to believe that many of the same governments who
supply these useless summaries will be more forthcoming in the trade context where
the stakes in real dollars are much higher." Id.
97. A host of other international organizations also help to form trade policy, such
as the United Nations Conference on Trade Development, however these are not dealt
with here.
98. See Resolution of the Council Concerning the Classification of Documents and Security
Precautions, OECD Doc. C/M(62) 11 (Final), Item 109 a), b), and c) (May 22, 1962); see
also, e g., Environment Directorate, Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts, Environmen-
tal Reviews of Trade Policies and Agreements, OECD Doc. COM/ENV/TD (94) 14 (Mar. 8-
10, 1994) [hereinafter OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts] (marked
"Restricted"). This OECD classification has not always worked this way. In the past, the
United States position was that such a restricted classification was for OECD and not
United States government purposes. Conversation with AmbassadorJoseph Greenwald,
former U.S. Ambassador to the OECD, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 8, 1993). This
allowed the United States government to disseminate more widely OECD documents
for comment. Id. Although it is impossible to pinpoint the exact time of the change in
positions, the current U.S. policy is to closely adhere to the restrictions placed on docu-
ments by the OECD. This policy, however, is not currently followed by all OECD mem-
ber governments, many of which feel free to routinely distributed restricted OECD
documents to their constituencies. Cf Jackson, supra note 58, at 231 (discussing same
problem in GAIT context).
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ing texts of member governments that might properly be restricted, others
are papers by outside experts commissioned by the OECD.9 9 These
papers do not generally contain classified or confidential information and
they clearly do not represent the views of the OECD or its members.' 0 0
Yet, for no readily apparent reason, they are still restricted.
The public is also restricted from attending most OECD meetings.' 0 t
OECD ministerial meetings are closed to everyone but the delegations of
its members. Beginning in 1992, the United States has, in the trade and
environment area, made representatives of interested NGOs part of the
U.S. delegation to OECD meetings.' 0 2 This U.S. action has been meet by
intense criticism from other OECD countries, none of which have fol-
lowed the U.S. lead and expanded their delegations to include nongovern-
mental representatives. While this U.S. action is an important symbolic
step towards greater openness at the OECD, its practical value is limited.
NGO members of a delegation may only be present for general discussions
and must leave the room during any negotiating sessions. 10 3 Because of
this limitation, NGO representatives only hear rhetoric and posturing.
Similarly, individual NGO members of delegations can be vetoed by any
OECD member who finds the particular NGO representative, or their
views, offensive.' 0 4 While this veto has not yet been utilized, it hangs, like
a sword of Damocles, as a means of subtle 'control over the head of every
potential NGO representative.
The OECD does provide a very limited number of NGOs certain addi-
tional participatory opportunities. In accordance with the decision of the
OECD Governing Council of March i3, 1962, NGOs that are deemed to
be widely representative in general economic matters or in a specific eco-
nomic sector can be granted consultative status.10 5 This status allows them
to discuss subjects of common interest with a Liaison Committee chaired
by the OECD Secretary General, and to be consulted on particular OECD
activities by the relevant OECD officials or committees.' 0 6 Because of
their consultative status, these NGOs also are given access to certain docu-
ments that the public does not have access to.10 7 However, the other lim-
99. See, e.g., OECD Joint Session of Trade and Environment Experts, supra note 98.
100. See, e.g., id.
101. See The Impacts of Trade Agreements on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource
Conservation Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, supra note 55, at 25, 87 (statement of
Robert Housman, Attorney, and Paul Orbuch, Attorney, Center for International Envi-
ronmental Law).
102. Seeid. at5-6.
103. See id. at 6.
104. See id.
105. See ORGANIZA71ON FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD
IN BRIEF 17; Decision of the Council on Relations with International Non-Governmental Organi-
zations, OECD Doc. C/M(62)7(Final), Item 59 (a), (b), and (c)-Doc. No. C(62)45
(Mar. 13, 1962) (the NGO must also meet certain additional requirements).
106. Id.
107. See Letter from David H. Small, Deputy Legal Counsel, OECD, to David Wirth,
Professor, Washington & Lee Law School, Sept. 21, 1993.
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its to participation-for example, the inability to attend negotiating
sessions and to obtain documents-still generally apply even to these con-
sultative NGOs.
The number of NGOs that have been granted consultative status is
quite limited and their industry orientation further skews OECD decision-
making. To date, only the Business and Industry Advisory Committee
(BIAC) to the OECD, the Trade Advisory Committee to the OECD, the
International Association of Crafts and Small and Medium-Sized Enter-
prises, the International Federation of Agricultural Producers, and the
European Confederation of Agriculture have been granted special status
by the OECD.10 8 Organized labor also consults with the OECD through
the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC).109 The TUAC is the only
non-industrial interest represented.
The OECD is of special importance to trade policy making because of
the manner in which it is used by developed countries-the most powerful
nations in international trade-to develop common positions to advance
through the GATT. The closed-door nature of OECD proceedings, and its
at times hostile attitude toward providing greater participation, allows for
the development of OECD policies that do not necessarily reflect the views
of the citizens of its member nations-nations referred to throughout the
Cold War as the leaders of the free world.
2. Codex
Unlike other international trade decision-making bodies that have been
openly hostile to participatory decision-making, Codex has a history of
openness. Codex is an intergovernmental organization within the United
Nations system whose primary goals are to ensure food safety, and to pro-
tect against unfair trade practices in food trade.11 0 One of Codex's most
important tasks is the harmonization of food safety standards."' Codex
standards are communicated to the GATT and receive substantial defer-
ence during both GATT negotiations and GATT dispute panel
proceedings." 2
Although only states can be voting members of Codex," 3 the Secre-
108. See id. (BIAC and TUAC receive restricted documents for consultative purposes,
but they have no right to those documents).
109. Id.
110. CODEX AL1mENTARIUS COMMISSION, PROCEDURAL MANUAL art. 1 (8th ed.). See
DONNA U. VOG"T, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvicE, SANrrARY AND PHYrOsANrrARY
MEAsuRES PERTAINING TO FOOD IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 20-21 (Sept. 11,
1992)
111. CODEX AuMENTARIUS COMMISSION, supra note 110, art. 1(d).
112. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitaty and Phytosanitay Measures, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4, preamble (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter SPS Agreement], in Final Agree-
ment, supra note 78. The Preamble to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures provides that one of the GATT's goals is "to further the use
of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures between [Parties] on the basis of
international standards, guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant
international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission .... " Id.
113. See CODEX AuMENTARIUS COMMISSION, supra note 110, art. 2.
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tary General of Codex may invite NGOs to participate as observers. 114
Observer status has been widely granted to a range of NGOs, including
primary producer organizations, processor organizations, standards orga-
nizations, as well as to nations who are not Codex members. Observer
status has also been granted to at least one consumer organization.
Observers can receive Codex reports, take part in the preparatory work
prior to meetings, and speak during meetings.
While Codex's procedures provide a participatory model for other
international trade organizations, it is not without its own participatory
flaws.115 Codex's principal participatory flaw is in the makeup of the indi-
vidual country delegations-the actual Codex decision-makers. These
country delegations commonly include a significant number of represent-
atives from the agribusiness or pharmaceutical industry sectors."16 Con-
sumer and food safety groups, which could offset the participation of the
regulated community, are not generally found on Codex delegations or
consulted on proposed standards."l 7 For example, a 1993 study by the
National Food Alliance found that "over four-fifths of the nongovernmen-
tal participants on national delegations to Codex committees represented
industry, while only one percent represented public interest organiza-
tions.""18 The undesirable result is that food safety votes taken by Codex
are heavily and disproportionately influenced by the regulated commu-
nity. The need to correct this imbalance was recognized at the 1991 FAO/
WHO Conference on Food Standards, Chemicals in Food and Food
Trade." 9 However, despite this recognition, an October 1993 report by
the International Organization of Consumers Unions found that little pro-
gress has been made in addressing this problem.12
0
Codex also suffers from another major participatory flaw in that while
nongovernmental participation is allowed in many of its activities, its stan-
dard setting processes are closed to the public.' 2 ' For example, the public
may not obtain or directly submit comments on the standards for pesticide
residues developed within either the Codex Committee on Pesticide Resi-
114. Id. at rule VII.4-.5.
115. See generally PATTr GoLMAN & RIcHARD WILEs, TRADING AWAY U.S. FOOD SAFETY
53 (1994).
116. See International Organization of Consumer Unions, Consumer Involvement in
Decision-Making in Relation to Food Standards and the Joint FAO/WHO Food Stan-
dards Programme, Item 10, 1, 2, 3 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter International Consumer
Unions Report]; Daphne Wysham, The Codex Connection: Big Business Hgacks GA7T, 251
NATION 770, 771-72 (1990); Mark Ritchie, GATT, Agriculture and the Environmen 20
EcoLoarsr 214, 216-17 (1990).
117. See EPA Official Calls for Input on Food From Consumer and Industy Groups, 9 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1231 (July 15, 1992) (paraphrasing a letter to the EPA from Patti
Goldman of Public Citizen as "three U.S. agencies at least since 1985 have failed to
comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act because only industry representatives
have been allowed to participate in an advisory committee process.").
118. Goldam & Wiles, supra note 115, at 62 (citing NAnONAL FOOD ALLIANCME, CRAcK-
ING THE CODEx: AN ANALYsIS OF WHO SEm WORLD FOOD STANDARDS 67 (1993)).
119. See International Consumer Unions Report, supra note 116, at 1-2.
120. See id. at 2-4.
121. GoLDMAN & WINEs, supra note 115, at 53-54.
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dues or the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues; the public may only par-
ticipate by commenting through their respective national delegation-the
same delegations that are disproportionately industry oriented.
12 2
C. Regional Trade Agreements
Although the rules of the existing GATT and the Final Agreement both
require the parties to extend most favored nation (MFN) trade status to
the products, and in the case of the Final Agreement to the services, of all
other contracting parties, these agreements also allow the parties to pro-
vide more favorable treatment within "free trade areas."1 23 The parties to
such free trade area agreements are accorded wide latitude to deviate
from the GATr and Final Agreement rules in crafting the rules to govern
trade among the parties. This ability to craft new rules through free trade
area agreements presents an important opportunity to democratize trade
decision-making. Not only can these agreements alter the rules between
limited number of parties, they can also serve as important testing grounds
for developing workable reforms to trade rules that can then be interna-
tionalized at a later date. 124 Unfortunately, this opportunity has not been
acted upon. This section analyzes the democratic failures of the North
122. Id.
123. See GATr, supra note 16, art. XXIV(8) (b); WTO Agreement supra note 79, Annex
IA, para. L.a (incorporating by reference 1947 GATT Agreement into the Final Agree-
ment). The most commonly known form of free trade area agreements are regional
trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (the NAFTA).
See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (discussing the NAFTA). GATT defines a
free trade area as:
[A] group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other
restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XV, XV and XX) are eliminated on substantially
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such
territories.
GATT, supra note 16, art. XXIV(8) (b). The trade community remains largely divided as
to whether such free trade area agreements are good or bad for the international trad-
ing system. Compare C. Michael Aho, More Bilateral Trade Agreements Would Be a Blunder.
What the New President Should Do, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25, 25-26 (1989) (outlining the
harms caused by free trade agreements to the international trading system) with C.
Michael Hathaway & Sandra Masur, The Right Emphasis for U.S. Trade Polizy for the 1990s:
Positive Bilateralism, 8 B.U. INT'L LJ. 207, 211-16 (1990) (discussing the benefits of free
trade area agreements).
124. ROBERT F. HousMAN, RECONCILING TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT. LESSONS
FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 (UNEP Environment and Trade
Series No. 3, 1994) [hereinafter UNEP, LESSONS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT]. Cf Hathaway & Masur, supra note 123, at 211-12 (discussing the
role that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and related bilateral trade
agreements played in setting the stage for the GAIT). For example, the NAFTA's basic
rights and obligations as to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures provide that the
parties have the right to adopt a level of protection independent of any international
standard. See NAFIA, infra note 125, art. 712.1. Once this provision had been secured
in the NAFTA, the United States took it to the Uruguay Round table during the final
days of negotiations and was able to secure changes in the SPS provisions of the Final
Agreement that reflect the basic premise of the NAFTA SPS text. See GATT TBT Agree-
ment Reveals Failure of U.S. to Secure Changes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 24, 1993, at 11.
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) I2 as evidence of the failure of
regional agreements to address the need for democratizing trade decision-
making. The NAFTA is chosen here because it has been widely heralded
as the most progressive trade agreement and because it is the broadest
regional agreement to emerge of late.
1. The NAFTA
The NAFTA creates a regional trading agreement between Canada, the
United States, and Mexico that "extend[s] from the polar extremes of the
Yukon to the coral reefs of the Yucatan ... ."126 Although the NAFTA and
its parallel agreements on labor 12 7 and environment 2 8 have garnered
much praise for beginning the process of integrating trade and other
areas of social policy, the NAFTA is strikingly deficient with regard to
democracy.129
By the time the NAFTA debate made its way into the public eye and
onto the congressional radar screen, the trade and environment debate
was already well underway and democracy issues had emerged as a critical
cluster of issues.13 0 The debate over democracy and the NAFTA, however,
brought a new twist: Mexico's historical record of human rights abuses
and democratic failures. 13 ' Labor, environmental, and human rights
groups argued that opening up the NAFTA to public participation was
necessary not only to advance the democratization of trade, but also to
advance democratic reforms in Mexico; NAFTA-driven democratic
reforms would provide a wedge behind which democratic reforms in Mex-
ico could follow.' 3 2 Despite these efforts, the parties steadfastly refused to
125. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.LM. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
126. Robert F. Housman & Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Con-
cerns Into the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 719, 722 (1993); see UNEP, LESSONS FROM THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 124, at 1.
127. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter PLA].
128. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993,
Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter PEA].
129. See UNEP, LESSONs FROM THE NORTH AMmUCAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra
note 124, at 33.
130. See, e.g., Ed Broadbent, Human Rights and North American Free Trad4 TORONTO
STAR, Mar. 9, 1992, at A15; Damian Fraser, New Links Acrass the Border, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
13, 1991, at 4.
131. See, e.g., MINNESOTA ADvocATEs FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, No DOUBLE STANDARDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw: LINKAGE OF NAFTA wrrH HEMISPHERIC SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT Is NEEDED (Dec. 1992); see also AMNESrY INTERNATIONAL, AMNFSTY INTER-
NATIONAL REPORT 156-59 (1991) (documenting Mexican human rights and democra-
cies problems). "The widespread use of torture and treatment by law enforcement
agents, in some cases leading to the death of detainees, continued to be reported ....
[A]llegations of electoral fraud by the governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) ... during state and local elections in December 1989 triggered widespread pro-
tests .... " Id. at 156-57.
132. This pressure to use NAFTA to drive democracy may have been one of the
major reasons why Mexico was one of the leading footdraggers on public participation
in the NAFTA.
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open regional trade decision-making to the public.'3 3
2. The Relevant Provisions and Policies of the NAFTA
The NAFTA's provisions on public participation in trade decision-making
are for all practical purposes the same as those of the GATT and the Final
Agreement. NAFTA decision-making will be conducted under the aus-
pices of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FrC). 4 Because the
NAFTA is silent as to public participation in FTC proceedings, 35 it seems
likely that by default the FTC will continue the tradition of undemocratic
trade decision-making. Thus, it is likely that the FTC and the other
NAFTA trade decision-making bodies will sit in closed secret sessions.
Similarly, it is likely that no transcripts or reports of the meetings of
NAFTA decision-making bodies will be made available to the public.
The NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions also carryover at the
regional level the democratic flaws of international trade dispute resolu-
tion under the GATT and the Final Agreement. Dispute panels formed
under the NAFTA are open only to interested member states.13 6 NGOs
and members of the general public are precluded from participating in
these hearings. Interested private parties are also prohibited from inde-
pendently submitting information to panels. In fact, NGOs and individu-
als are even prohibited from merely attending these proceedings. In a
similar vein of secrecy, the pleadings of the parties in NAFTA disputes are
confidential and cannot be released to the public without the prior
approval of the party in question.13 7 Moreover, the public is precluded
from knowing how each of the panelists ruled and why, and, under certain
circumstances, can even be denied access to the final decisions of these
panels.'38
3. The Relevant Provisions and Policies of the NAFTA Parallel Agreements on
Labor and the Environment
The NAFTA parallel labor agreement l 9" (PLA) and the parallel environ-
mental agreement 40 (PEA) are seen by the NAFTA parties as playing a
substantial role in addressing the public's concerns over the potential for
NAFTA implementation to harm the interests of workers or the environ-
ment. These agreements offered a major opportunity to begin to bring
133. UNEP, LEssONs FROM THE NoRTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note
124, at 33. The failure to democratize the NAFTA's decision-making processes has
since been cited as one of the causes of the peasant uprisings in the Mexican state of
Chiapas that have followed the implementation of the NAFTA. Cf Todd Robberson,
How Mexico Brewed a Rebellion, WASH. PosT, Jan. 9, 1994, at A31.
134. NAFTA, supra note 125, art. 2001.
135. See id. art. 2001.4 (providing that the FTC's rules are still to be developed).
136. See id. arts. 2012.1(b), 2013.
137. See id. art. 2012.1(b).
138. Id. arts. 2017.2 (panelists associated with majority or minority opinions are not
to be disclosed), 2017.4 (requirement to publish final reports may be avoided by
consensus).
139. PLA, supra note 127.
140. PEA, supra note 128.
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the public into trade-related decision-making. Given that (1) the NAFTA
parallel agreements were directed at quelling NAFTA criticisms by the
labor and environmental communities, (2) many of these criticisms
focused on the undemocratic nature of the NAFTA, and (3) the issues to
be addressed under these agreements, while trade-related, were not core
trade issues, one might assume that the trade-related decision-making
processes under these parallel agreements would be more open to demo-
cratic principles. Nothing, however, could be farther from the truth.
4. The Parallel Environmental Agreement
The PEA establishes four bodies or processes that directly relate to trade
decision-making: (1) a Commission on Environmental Cooperation (the
Environmental Commission) directed by a council of ministers (the Envi-
ronmental Council), (2) a standing secretariat (the Environmental Secre-
tariat), (3) a Joint Public Advisory Committee (the JPA), and (4) a
dispute resolution process to review cases concerning certain failures of
the parties to enforce effectively their domestic environmental laws.14 '
The decision-making processes of all four of these newly established bod-
ies are markedly undemocratic.
The newly established Environmental Commission is headed by the
Environmental Council, which is composed of the environmental minis-
ters of each of the parties. 142 Under the rules establishing the Environ-
mental Council, each of the Council's regular annual meetings must
include a public component, and the Environmental Council may, at its
own.election, decide to hold other meetings in public.143 While these
provisions require certain public access to Environmental Council meet-
ings, the PEA fails to provide any requirements as to the amount or per-
centage of the Environmental Council's time that must be spent in public
meetings. Thus, the Environmental Council could fulfill the PEA's
requirements by merely holding a public press conference at the close of
each of its annual meetings. The PEA is also silent as to what role the
public can play within these meetings. For example, it is unclear whether
the public may present oral testimony as to matters under the Environ-
mental Council's purview. Moreover, although the PEA provides that
"decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be made public,"
the Environmental Council may elect to keep any of its recommendations
or decisions confidential.' 4 4 The only Environmental Commission docu-
ment that the PEA requires to be made public is the Environmental Com-
mission's annual report.145
In order to conduct the day-to-day affairs of the Environmental Com-
mission, the PEA also establishes a standing Environmental Secretariat.
The Environmental Secretariat's most important responsibilities are to
141. See PEA, supra note 128, arts. 8-16, 22-45.
142. Id. art. 9.1.
143. Id. art. 9.4.
144. Id. art. 9.7.
145. See id. art. 12.1.
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prepare factual records concerning submissions on enforcement mat-
ters146 and to prepare reports on a wide range of issues not related to
enforcement matters. 147
From a public participation perspective several things are troubling
about the Environmental Secretariat's factual record powers. First, the
Environmental Secretariat requires a two-thirds vote of the Environmental
Council before proceeding on a citizen's or NGO's submission, and the
Council partially consists of the most senior environmental officials of the
very governments whose environmental actions are the subject of the com-
plaint.' 48 Second, the ability of the complainant and the public to gain
access to these records is entirely dependent upon the Environmental
Council's determination as to whether these documents should be made
public.' 49 Third, even where a public submission successfully passes
through the screening, response, and report phases of the submission pro-
cess, the only thing that the public has to show for its efforts is a report.'5 0
This end result stands in sharp contrast to the real teeth provided under
the NAFTA dispute resolution processes.' 5 '
146. Id. art. 14. Under the terms of the agreement the Secretariat is empowered to
consider qualifying submissions from NGOs and private individuals. Id. art. 14.1. In
order for a submission to be considered by the Secretariat, it must: 1) be written in a
designated notification language, 2) clearly identify the person or NGO making the
submission, 3) provide sufficient information to allow the secretariat to review the sub-
mission, 4) appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry, 5) indicate that the matter was previously communicated to the party in ques-
tion and discuss the party's response, and 6) be filled by a person or NGO residing in
the territory of a party. I& art. 14.1 (a)-(f). If the secretariat determines that a submis-
sion meets these criteria, then the secretariat is required to determine whether the
submission warrants requesting the party in question to respond. Id. art. 14.2. In mak-
ing this second determination the Secretariat is instructed to look at whether. 1) the
submission alleges a harm to the person or NGO making it, 2) the submission alone or
taken with other submissions raises matters "whose further study... would advance" the
agreement's goals, 3) available private remedies have been pursued, and 4) the submis-
sion is drawn exclusively from mass media reports. Id. art. 14.2(a)-(d).
If after reviewing all these factors the Secretariat determines that further action on a
submission is warranted, the Secretariat can ask the party or parties involved to
respond. Id art. 14.2. The PEA is silent as to whether the response of a party is to be
made available to either the complaining person or NGO or to the general public,
raising the inference that these responses are to be kept confidential. If the party
responds that the matter is the subject of "pending judicial or administrative proceed-
ings" the entire process ends. Id. art. 14.3(a). In all other cases, once the Secretariat
has received and considered the party's response, it may request permission from the
Council to develop a factual record. Id. art. 15.1. The Commission can by a two-thirds
vote block the Secretariat from proceeding. Id. art. 15.2. In cases where the Secretariat
is permitted to prepare a factual record, this record is submitted to the Council. Id. art.
15.6. Here again, the Council can block publication of the report by a two-thirds vote
against making the record public. Id. art. 15.7.
147. Id. art. 13.1.
148. Id. art. 15.2.
149. Id. art. 15.7.
150. See UNEP LESSONS FROM THE NORTH AMEmcAN FRE TRADE AGREEMENT, supra
note 124, at 42.
151. See NAFrA, supra note 125, art. 2019 (suspension of benefits).
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In addition to its responsibility to oversee submissions from the public
on enforcement matters, the PEA also allows the Environmental Secreta-
riat to prepare factual reports on a wide range of topics, so long as they are
unrelated to a party's failure to effectively enforce its domestic environ-
mental laws.' 5 2 Where the Environmental Secretariat is allowed by the
Council to prepare such a report,' 53 the Environmental Secretariat may
rely upon information that is, inter alia, provided by the public, the JPAC,
or gathered through public consultations. 154 Unfortunately, the public
can be denied access to these Environmental Secretariat reports by a con-
sensus vote of the Environmental Council. 155
The one participatory mechanism built into the Environmental Com-
mission's structure is theJPAC. 156 However, despite the fact that theJPAC
is intended to serve as the public's principal access point into the Environ-
mental Commission, essential issues with regard to its membership and
workings are undefined in the PEA. For example, although the JPAC is
called the "Joint Public Advisory Committee," the PEA does not actually
require that its membership be drawn from the private sector.157 This
stands in sharp contrast to the rule on membership of the optional
National Advisory Committees (NACs).158 If a NAFTA party opts to form
a NAC, the PEA requires that its membership come solely from the private
sector. 1
59
Moreover, although the JPAC is ostensibly the public's NAFTA envi-
ronmental eyes and ears, the Environmental Commission can block the
JPAC's access to factual records prepared by the Secretariat under article
13 of the PEA. 160 The PEA's limits on the powers of the JPAC, coupled
with its vagaries concerning the JPAC's composition raise serious issues
with regard to theJPAC's ability to further democratize international trade
decision-making.
The PEA also provides for a special dispute resolution process, to be
carried out under the auspices of the Environmental Commission, which
is intended to ensure that NAFTA-driven trade liberalization does not pro-
vide a party with a competitive advantage from the failure to effectively
implement its own domestic environmental laws.1 1 In addition to the
substantial substantive flaws that plague this dispute resolution process,
152. PEA, supra note 128, art. 13.1.
153. See it. Secretariat's ability to report on environmental matters is dependent on
a decision of the Council. Id. Prior to beginning work on a report, the Secretariat must
notify the Council of its intention to prepare a report on a given topic. Id. The Council
by a two-thirds vote can prohibit the Secretary from moving forward with the report. Id.
154. Id. art. 13.2.
155. I. art. 13.3.
156. Id. art. 16. Under the terms of the PEA, and unless the Environmental Council
decides otherwise, theJPAC will be comprised of 15 members. Id. art. 16.1. Each party
is responsible for appointing an equal number of these members. Id.
157. See id. art. 16.
158. Id. art. 17.
159. Id.
160. Id. art. 16.7.
161. See id. arts. 22-45.
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the process makes virtually no democratic improvements over traditional
trade dispute rules.
Under the PEA, enforcement disputes will be resolved between the
parties and an arbitral panel. 162 The agreement provides little guidance
as to the actual rules of procedure that will govern the conduct of these
disputes, opting instead to place responsibility to develop these model
rules on the Environmental Council. 16 3 The parties' consistent reluctance
to open the NAIFTA and NAFTA-related processes to the public, coupled
with the PEA's provisions limiting disputes to the parties, are grounds for
concern that once adopted these model rules will not deviate far from the
restrictive participatory rules provided for under the NAIFTA's dispute res-
olution provisions.
5. The Parallel Labor Agreement
Similar to the PEA, its environmental counterpart, the PIA, also estab-
lishes a Commission for Labor Cooperation (the Labor Commission),
headed up by a Council of Ministers (the Labor Council), and a standing
secretariat (the Labor Secretariat).164 In addition, the PLA also tracks the
PEA by providing a dispute mechanism to ensure that the failure of a party
to effectively enforce its labor laws does not result in a competitive advan-
tage.16 5 The PLA, however, differs from the PEA by placing many of the
equivalent implementation responsibilities on National Administrative
Offices (NAOs), rather than on the Labor Secretariat. 166 The democratic
limits inherent in the PLA structure are arguably far worse than even those
that plague the PEA.
Unlike the Environmental Council, which must meet in public during
at least some portion of its regular annual meetings, the Labor Council is
not required by the PLA to meet in public. The PLA provides only that
"[t] he [Labor] Council may hold public sessions to report on appropriate
matters."167 By limiting the Labor Council's ability to meet in public only
to reporting on such matters, this provision seriously curtails the public's
access to the activities of the Labor Council.
The actions of the Labor Secretariat that provide access to the public
into aspects of trade decision-making are also far more constrained.
Unlike the PEA, the PLA fails to provide a mechanism for the public to
submit complaints to the Labor Secretariat. Instead, oversight of the par-
ties' labor practices will be the responsibility of the NAOs. The NAOs are
federal offices formed within the governments of each party.168 Where a
NAO believes that a problem exists with another party's labor practices,
the NAO is empowered to request the other party's NAO to engage in
162. Id. arts. 24, 28.
163. Id. art. 28.1.
164. PLA, supra note 127, art. 8.
165. Id. arts. 27-41.
166. Id. arts. 15-16.
167. Id. art. 9.4.
168. Id. art. 15.1.
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consultations on the matter.169
In addition to the NAO oversight processes, the PLA also provides for
the establishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to review
disputes under the PLA. ECEs will be comprised of three members who
are independent of, and not affiliated with or answering to, any party or
the Labor Secretariat. 170 This ECE membership mandate would seem to
require that many of these ECE members will be nongovernmental
experts selected from the public at large. In evaluating a dispute, ECEs
may invite comments from members of the public and NGOs with relevant
expertise. 171 At the end of their evaluations, ECEs are required to pre-
pare a final report.172 Here again, the Labor Council can block publica-
tion of these reports by a consensus vote.'
73
Also in the area of disputes, the PLA's dispute resolution mechanism
also suffers from the same flaws found in the similar provisions of the PEA.
The PLA's rules of procedure for disputes remain to be determined by the
Labor Council. 174 It remains to be seen whether the same NAFTA parties
that refused to democratize the dispute resolution provisions of chapter
20 of the NAFTA, will now provide more democratic rules for PLA
disputes.
In addition to the PLA's limits to democracy in the context of dis-
putes, the reporting abilities of the Labor Secretariat are highly con-
strained. Although the PLA may report on certain NAFTA-related issues,
PLA reports are limited to the review of publicly available information sup-
plied by the parties. 175 Thus, the public cannot look to the Labor Secreta-
riat to develop new and independent information. Moreover, the Labor
Council must approve all reports and studies of the Labor Secretariat
before they can become public. 176
Finally, the PLA fails to provide for a LaborJPAC or any other mecha-
nism for members of the public to provide direct guidance to the Labor
Council. Thus, the PLA lacks even the PEVs flawed advisory mechanisms
for public input and oversight. The PIA does, however, provide that each
party may, if it so chooses, convene a Labor NAC to advise it on the imple-
mentation of the PIA177
169. Id. art. 21.
170. Id. art. 24.1(a)-(c).
171. Id. art. 24.1(e).
172. Id. art. 26.1. The ECE does not have to submit a final report if the Council
otherwise decides. Id.
173. Id. art. 26.2.
174. Id. art. 33.1.
175. Id, art. 14.1.
176. I& art. 14.4.
177. Id, art. 17.
Cornell International Law Journal
MI. The Effects of the Lack of Democracy in International Trade
Decision-making
The failure of international trade agreements, like the GATT, the Final
Agreement, and the NAFTA, to provide avenues for democratic participa-
tion by citizens has a number of very real and disturbing consequences.
These consequences not only effect the spread of democracy, but also
hamper the conduct of democracy in nations that have already adopted
democratic forms of government.
One of the most disturbing consequences of the democratic failures
of international trade agreements is the impact that such failures have on
the spread of democracy around the world. Just as the spread of democ-
racy can promote expanded liberalized trade, so too can the spread of
trade, if properly carried out, promote democracy. 178 The failure to pro-
vide for democracy in international trade decision-making squanders an
important opportunity to advance the expansion of democracy in nations
that are currently undemocratic. 179 This failure also neglects the opportu-
nity to use the expanded economic opportunities of trade agreement
membership as an inducement, or carrot, to encourage nations to
democratize.' 8 0
Properly constructed, international trade rules could ensure, at least
as to the matters covered under these agreements, that the citizens of
nondemocratic countries would have access to democratic processes. By
providing access to democracy in trade-related areas, democratized trade
agreements would make it more difficult for non-democracies to deny
their citizens similar rights in other contexts.18 ' Presented with working
democratic models in trade-related areas, nondemocratic governments
would find it more difficult to argue that democracy is not feasible given
their situation. Granting citizens the right democratically to participate in
trade-related areas would also furnish them with a taste for democracy,
spurring them to demand greater democratic rights from their govern-
ments. Moreover, by participating, even on a limited basis, in democratic
systems, these citizens would learn how democracies function, which
178. See, e.g., James Lilley, Freedom Through Trade, 94 FoREIGN POL'Y 37 (1994) (dis-
cussing the role of international trade in the expansion of democracy in China).
179. Cf Marcellus S. Snow, Trade in Information Services in Asia, ASEAN, and the Pacific:
Conceptual Issues and Policy Examples, 28 CAL. W. L. Rxv. 329 (1991-1992) (discussing the
ASEAN-U.S. Initiative report, a study funded in part by the U.S. government, which
concludes that the expansion of liberalized trade is linked to the growth of
democracies).
180. See Kittrie, supra note 1, at 376 ("To benefit from 'Most-Favored-Nation' treat-
ment in their trading with the United States or Common Market countries, some of the
most oppressive regimes of yesteryear now seek certification as adherents of the demo-
cratic ideal and process.").
181. Cf Sidney Weintraub & Delal Baer, The Interplay Between Economic and Political
Opening. The Sequence in Mexico, WASH. Q., Spring 1992, at 187, 200. In discussing the
role expanding economic rights play in pushing the expansion of democratic rights in
Mexico, Weintraub and Baer provide: "[a]s economic reform proceeds, Mexican
authorities will not then have the luxury of compartmentalizing politics and economics.
These two strands of national life will rapidly become part of the same process." Id.
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would ease the transition to democratic systems of government. However,
the seeds of democracy will be difficult to sow abroad if international trade
decision-making remains undemocratic in nature.182
The failure of international trade decision-making to reflect demo-
cratic principles also serves as an obstacle to the current trend towards the
democratization of international law. In a host of other international fora
there is an increasing recognition of the role of the individual and of
NGOs in the making and conduct of international law.18 3 Foreign inves-
tors and businesses involved in trade are increasingly tearing down the
artificial walls that have long separated public and private international
law.' 8 4 In addition, advances in the area of international human rights
law represent a growing recognition of the rights of individuals as separate
and distinct from the rights of national governments.' 8 5 However, the fail-
ure of international trade law to provide individual democratic rights in
social areas undercuts this trend of development.
The undemocratic nature of international trade decision-making not
only squanders an opportunity to foster greater democracy around the
182. Two other aspects of international trade can serve to increase democracy even
absent the democratization of trade agreements. First, the information revolution that
normally accompanies a country's opening of its markets serves as an important tool for
democracy. The phones, faxes, satellites and televisions that are needed to compete
bring more than just commodity reports. These tools bring openness and provide citi-
zens access to the rest of the world. See Lilley, supra note 178, at 40.
Second, the decentralization of economic activities necessary to compete in interna-
tional markets with free market economies undercuts the centralized state control
found in many undemocratic countries. See id. "For example, the basic unit of commu-
nist control in China, known as the danwei, or work unit has virtually disappeared in
[China's] prosperous south .... " Id.
While these two factors are important to the spread of democracy, they cannot
replace the rule-based changes that democratic trade agreements could bring. The
essential difference here is that the two factors discussed above are changes of conven-
ience, while the changes required by democratic trade agreements are changes rooted
in law. Law-based democratic changes have at least two important advantages. First,
they encourage nations to adopt democratic legal systems. Second, they are harder to
rescind than changes of convenience.
183. SeeJohn H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Institutions for a New Age, 81
GEO. L.J. 535, 538-40 (1993) (noting that the recognition of "persons" in international
law is the "inevitable result of the increasing global interactions and shared interests...
across frontiers").
184. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 125, arts. 1715, 1716 (providing private intellectual
property rights holders with the trans-NAFTA right to judicial and administrative proce-
dures to enforce their rights); see also Barton & Carter, supra note 183, at 539; Joel R.
Paul, The Isolation of Private Jnternational Law, 7 Wis. INr'L L.J. 149, 152-53 (1988);
Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L
Rzv. 1349 (1982).
185. See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/
39/506 (1984) entered into force June 26, 1987, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as
modfiled, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 93 U.N.T.S. 4; see also Barton & Carter,
supra note 183, at 540; Louis Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. Rzv. 1 (1982); Fernando R. Tes6n, 77W Kant-
ian Theoy of International Law, 92 CoLum. L. REy. 53 (1992).
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world, but it also serves to undermine the role of democracy in nations
that already have democratic systems of government. In the case of trade
negotiations, international diplomats-beholden only to their heads of
state-can in closed door sessions, the results of which are generally over-
looked by the public,18 6 essentially negotiate away standards that are
enacted by democratically elected legislators-who are directly responsi-
ble to their constituents-through open and democratic national legisla-
tive processes. 187
Although the heads of state of most democratic nations are elected,
they are often times further removed from the average citizen than are
representatives in the legislative branches of government 88 Thus, by sub-
fly, or not so subtly, shifting power away from legislative bodies, which are
most accountable to citizens, to heads of state, who are less accountable to
their national constituencies, current trade agreements constrain the
186. See Mead, supra note 50 ("The average reader sees the acronym GATT, followed,
say, by a reference to the European Community or the Group of Seven industrial
nations, and soon the eyes begin to glaze and a hand reaches mechanically to turn the
page.").
187. See William Greider, The Global Marketplace: A Closet Dictator, in THE CASE
AGAINST FREE TRADE 195, 207 (Earth Island Press ed., 1993).
The overall political effect of globalization is to further enhance the power of
the presidency... at the expense of representative forums, public debate and
accountability. Once an issue has become part of high-level diplomatic
exchanges, all of the details naturally become murkier, since negotiators do not
wish to talk too freely about their negotiating strategies. The discussions often
literally move offshore and behind closed doors-more irregular deal making
that will have the force of law.
Id.
188. See, e.g., Louis HENVKN, CONsTrrrnrONALusM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFuRS
37-38 (1990). Professor Henkin provides:
[O]urs is a unique, dual democracy .... Both Congress and the President are
representative; ... both accountable. But their representative character and
their accountability are different, and the differences should reflect and be
reflected in their authority .... In foreign affairs, the President represents the
people of the United States to the world. Congress represents the people at
home, the different regions, groups, constituencies, and interests (general and
special) .... The presidency is confidential, classified; Congress is open and
more accessible for citizen participation. Both are accountable, but the Presi-
dent's accountability is essentially plebiscitarian quadrennially. Congress-its
members-are accountable directly, daily.
Id.; Phillip R. Trimble, 1991 Survey of Books Relating to Law and Theory-Foreign Affairs,
Law and Democracy, 89 MiCH. L. Rv. 1371 (1991):
[Oif the three political institutions, members of the House of Representatives
represent the smallest constituencies, and hence are more likely to be immedi-
ately responsive to local and grassroots interests. Biennial elections assure regu-
lar accountability; members of the House should in theory most clearly
represent the will of the majority or plurality of the people in their districts
because they face reelection every two years. Congress, especially the House,
may also be better positioned to know the views of citizens because its members
are in close touch with constituents, and the constituency is smaller than the
nation as a whole.
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operation of democracy within national governments.18 9 Moreover, even
if one believes that legislative bodies are subject to capture by narrow
interests, current trade agreements also inhibit the actions of democratic
executive branches. The following examples show how current trade
agreements inhibit democratic representation. While these examples
focus on the system in the United States, similar effects can occur within
virtually any democratic national system of government. 19 0
Id. at 1378.
189. See Koh, supra note 87, at 171. "[A]t the core of the Fast Track critics' 'democ-
racy' objection may lie the nub of a valid concern, namely, that the Fast Track gives the
President greater freedom to shape trade agreements to his programmatic agenda than
would otherwise be possible under ordinary legislative process." Id. See also Mead, supra
note 50, at 37-45. Mr. Mead, who is one of the strongest critics of the shift away from
representative democracy that current trade agreements represent, provided the follow-
ing critique of the Final Agreement and the Bush administration's support for the Final
Agreement:
[The Final agreement would create a world government] in which career insid-
ers will have greater say than legislators-a circumstance that will elicit no out-
cry from [President Bush]
The idea of a political end run-of using international trade agreements to
force changes in U.S. law-attracts the administration on constitutional as well
as on economic grounds. Should George Bush be re-elected and the GAIT
treaty and NAFTA be signed, the result will be a historic shift in the constitu-
tional system of checks and balances among the three branches of the federal
government ....
But Bush's trade strategy will, if successful transfer critical powers away from
Congress for good ....
The Bush approach.., would assign virtually all commercial authority to the
executive. International trade agreements negotiated in secret by the executive
branch would take precedence over previously existing laws....
The congressional role in international commerce, and therefore to an
increasing extent in interstate commerce as well, would be limited to the peri-
odic ratification of trade agreements.
Id. at 38-39, 42-43.
Despite the substantial shift in power that trade agreements effect, this delegation of
authority to the executive does not offend the legal accountability of Congress because
the nondelegation doctrine "does not apply with equal force in the foreign affairs
realm." Koh, supra note 87, at 168 & n.67 (comparing A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), with United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 (1936)).
190. See, e.g., F.G.Jacobs, ConstitutionalDevelopments in the European Community and the
Impact of the European Single Market After 1992, 11 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 887 (1990). Mr.
Jacobs provides:
In the United Kingdom it had been thought that, because of the sovereignty
of Parliament, the European Communities Act of 1972, which gives effect to
Community law in the United Kingdom, could be overridden by a subsequent
conflicting act of Parliament. However, in the Factortame case in 1989, it
appears to have been accepted that acts of Parliament must yield to the case-law
of the European Court, and it appears to follow from the decision of the House
of Lords in that case that any act of Parliament subsequent to the European
Communities Act must be read as subject to directly enforceable rights arising
under Community law. In France, where the supreme administrative court
(Conseil d'Etat) had taken the position that it could review administrative
measures but not legislation, the decision of October 20, 1989 in the Nicolo case
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A. Effects on a Democratic Congress
First, the process of creating a trade agreement and bringing it to Con-
gress prevents citizens from fully understanding what is contained in a
given agreement at a time early enough to truly effect the implementation
of the agreement. Trade negotiations are conducted behind closed
doors.' 9 ' Trade agreements and their implementing legislation are con-
sidered restricted documents. 192 Frequently, as with the NAFTA, they are
only made available to the public a week or two prior to the Congressional
vote.193 This secrecy shelters the agreements and their implementing leg-
islation from critical analysis.' 94 Thus, while theoretically individuals may
debate a trade agreement over some time, the actual legal requirements
for implementing the agreement receive little in the way of attention. By
the time citizens receive an agreement and its implementing language,
and have a chance to analyze it, it is often too late to stop these all-or-
nothing package deals.
Similarly, Congressional review of trade agreements is overly con-
strained to the detriment of democracy. Although, for example, in the
United States, the Trade Acts require the U.S. Trade Representative to
consult with Congress during negotiations, 195 because the information
provided to Congressional members is classified, they are prohibited from
sharing this information. This prevents Congressional members, who rely
heavily on NGOs and other experts to formulate their positions, from
obtaining in a timely manner the information they need to review the
agreements.
Moreover, the Congressional members selected for consultation are
typically drawn from a limited number of Committees that have economic
concerns as their principal jurisdiction.'9 6 Consequently, social issues,
such as human rights or labor concerns, are less likely to receive oversight
through the Trade Acts consultation mechanism.
Some also argue that apart from the legally mandated consultation
marks a new departure. There, the Court appeared prepared to give effect to
the provisions of the EEC Treaty as overriding French legislation in the event of
conflict.
Id. at 895.
See also Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the
Italian Legal System and the European Community, 12 MICH.J. INT'L L. 173 (1990). These
constraints will, of course, function differently in parliamentary states versus presiden-
tial states. However, the constraints on democracy will exist nonetheless in both
systems.
191. See Lori Wallach, Hidden Dangers of GATT and NAFTA, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE
TRADE, supra note 187, at 23, 50.
192. Id.
193. See generally id.
194. See id at 50-51.
195. 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (1988). See Edmund W. Sim, Derailing the Fast-Trackfor Interna-
tional Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. INT'L L.J. 471, 498 (1990). Congressional advisers are
selected upon the recommendations of the Chairs of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee by, respectively, the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. 19 U.S.C. § 2211 (a) (1) (1988).
196. See Sim, supra note 195.
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process, the politically required "non-process"' 9 7 provides Congress gener-
ally, and the interests its members represent, with more than sufficient
input regarding the shaping of trade agreements and their implementing
legislation.' 98 Proponents of this argument assert that the non-process
effectively rescues democracy from a fast track assault.199
This argument, however, at times miscasts how the non-process works
in practice. Although key Congressional committees can derail a trade
agreement in the prenegotiation stage,200 derailing negotiations prevents
any agreement, not just a bad agreement, which is a most difficult choice
in this free trade era. Once a President is granted the authority to negoti-
ate, the ability of Congressional members to alter the course of an agree-
ment drops precipitously. This grant of authority allows the president to
turn attention away from anything but the bare Congressional up-down
minimum and to his or her own agenda. While the president must con-
sult with both Congress and certain private advisors during negotia-
tions,20 1 this shift to a bare minimum allows the president far greater
leeway than the typical legislative process.
The non-process kicks in again after the presentation of an agree-
ment to Congress by nonconferences and nonhearings. However, at this
197. During the period of time between the president's notification to Congress of
an intent to enter into a trade agreement, Congress conducts a non-legislative process
concerning a trade agreement. See id. at 500-02; Koh, supra note 87, at 164-65. During
these non-processes, Congressional committees conduct "nonhearings," hold
"nonmarkups," and "nonconferences." Id. at 164.
198. See Koh, supra note 87, at 164-65.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 150-51. During the prenegotiation stage of the United States-Canada free
trade negotiations, "a majority of the Senate Finance Committee threatened to disap-
prove the negotiations." Id. at 150. Only presidential concessions and a change in
position by one of the Committee's members allowed negotiations to go forward. Id.
201. Id. at 165. Even within the consultation process, the balance of democratic
access is dramatically skewed. Id. Consultations occur through the Private Sector Advi-
sory Committee System established under the 1974 Trade Act. Jan C. McAlpine & Pat
LeDonne, The United States Government Public Participation, and Trade and Environmen in
TRADE AND THE ENvnRONMFNT: LAw, ECONOMICS AND PoUcy 203, 210 (Durwood Zaelke
et al. eds., 1993). This three-tiered system consists of one over-arching committee (the
President's Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations), seven policy advi-
sory committees and more than thirty technical or sectoral committees. Id. These com-
mittees have a total membership of roughly one thousand advisors. Id. These
members, "however, represent the interests of their companies, not a wider public con-
stituency." Id.
Within this advisory structure the only non-business interest committee is the Labor
Advisory Committee. See USTR, Memorandum on Private Sector Advisory System 1-3
(Sept. 1992). However, because this committee is made up of only labor members and
has traditionally come down against new trade agreements, its advice has been some-
what ignored. For example, the Labor Committee was the only advisory committee not
to endorse the NAFTA, and none of the changes suggested by the committee were
adopted by either the Bush or Clinton administrations. See Letter from James D. Robin-
son, III & Kay R. Whitmore to President Bush (Sept. 11, 1992) (reprinted in ACTPN
Report). In 1992, five nongovernmental representatives from the environmental com-
munity were also put onto various existing committees. McAlpine & LeDonne, supra, at
211. Taken together, however, the labor and environmental advisors represent only the
smallest percentage of what is otherwise a business dominated advisory structure.
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stage, the non-process procedures are constrained by the no amendment
rule-nothing done at this stage can either amend or conflict with the
agreement before Congress. For example, these non-procedures did not
provide Congress with a vehicle to build democratic procedures into the
NAFTA institutions because the institutions were already locked in by the
NAFTA itself.
Second, the argument that non-process procedures save representa-
tive democracy under fast track also miscasts the power dynamic during
this legislative period. In practice, narrow industrial interests have held
the greatest sway during the non-process period. Last minute NAFTA
deals in industries ranged from orders for more C-17 military cargo planes
to limits on peanut butter imports from Canada.20 2 In many instances
these deals not only advanced narrow industrial interests, but they did so
at the expense of larger constituent interests. For example, in the final
days before the NAFTA vote in the House of Representatives, the USTR
cut a deal on a chemical known as methyl bromide with members of the
Florida delegation on behalf of the Florida Fruits and Vegetables Associa-
tion.20 3 Methyl bromide is a highly toxic substance that is regulated inter-
nationally because its use depletes the earth's ozone layer.20 4 The NAFTA
methyl bromide deal, which would have allowed the chemical to go unreg-
ulated until the year 2000, cut directly against a then proposed EPA rule
202. See Sarah Anderson & Ken Silverstein, Oink, Oink, 257 NATION 752 (reciting a
list of 19 confirmed NAFTA deals compiled by Public Citizen). The NAFTA list of con-
firmed deals also includes: a promise to site a $10 million Center for the Study of
Trade in the Western Hemisphere in a specific Congressional district; limits on Cana-
dian shipments of subsidized durum wheat; pressure on Mexico to extradite a man
suspected of raping the niece of a Congressional staff member, $250 million in funding
for the North American Development Bank; the award of two international air routes to
American Airlines; a promise not to raise grazing fees on federal lands; a written prom-
ise from the president to consider a certain district for the location of the $500,000 to
$3 million dollar National Institute of Standards and Technology; a promise to put
pressure on Mexico to hasten tariff reductions on certain appliances; $16 million to
complete an agricultural research center;, special protection for Louisiana and Florida
citrus, sugar, and vegetable producers; an agreement to provide an extra $15 million
for additional customs inspectors to enforce laws on textile imports; a pledge to push
for an additional five years of protection for the U.S. textile industry during GAIT
negotiations; an agreement to reverse a recommendation to cut helium subsidies; a
promise to protect the cut-flower industry, a pledge to protect "glass procedures;" a
pledge to pressure Canada to reduce subsidies to a Quebec chemical plant; and a prom-
ise of special protection for flat glass and broomcorn producers in a specific Congres-
sional district. Id. at 752-53. The only deal that this author is aware of that did not go
to a specific industrial interest was an agreement to develop an executive order on U.S.
procedures for public participation in the NAFTA environmental institutions. See Fed-
eral Implementation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (1994). Congressman Studds was
responsible for this agreement, and he should be congratulated for his willingness to
deviate from the pork barrel norm of his colleagues.
203. See David Lauter, Pesticide Flap Threatened CrucialDea LA. Timms Nov. 18, 1993,
at A17; Reduction in Methyl Bromide Production Raises Questions About Administration Dea
Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Nov. 19, 1993).
204. Lauter, supra note 203.
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that would have begun to immediately phase out the chemical. 205
Although the methyl bromide deal was killed,20 6 many of the most signifi-
cant NAFTA deals that emerged from the non-process procedures and
were accepted displayed a similar emphasis on the needs of particular
industrial constituent interests. 20 7 Environmental interests were not the
only larger social interests sacrificed during NAFTA deal making; labor
interests also suffered. For example, the Clinton administration agreed to
reductions in the proposed taxes on airline and cruise ship passengers
that had been earmarked to fund NAFTA worker retraining.20 8 These
examples reveal that the non-processes accompanying trade agreements
through Congressional consideration in the United States cannot be
relied on to address the democratic flaws of trade agreements.
Third, the take-it-or-leave-it way trade agreements tend to be
presented to domestic legislators also creates problems for democratic
countries. For example, in the United States, trade agreements typically
are considered under fast track rules that are designed to speed and ease
Congressional approval. "These procedures balance the Constitutionally
mandated need for Congressional input into trade agreement negotia-
tions with the need for efficiency in these negotiations (and the percep-
tion that full Congressional participation in such agreements is overly
cumbersome) ."209 The theory behind fast track is sound. Because trade
agreements encompass such a wide range of interests, they could easily be
picked to a legislative death if pieces of the package could be pulled off.210
However, the very enormity of these trade deals that causes the need for
fast track, also undermines the democratic ability of citizens to halt a bad
trade agreement; these deals have grown so big that they have become
make or break requirements for global economics, presidents, and the
like.2 11
Moreover, the fast track procedures themselves also reduce the demo-
cratic nature of the only democratic check on these secretive agree-
ments.21 2 As a practical matter fast track procedures limit the amount of
205. 14
206. Id. The deal was killed in that the final rule essentially adopted the provisions
of the originally proposed rule. See EPA, Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, Final Rulemak-
ing, 58 Fed. Reg. 69,238 (1993). Whether this means that the deal was fully killed never
to rise again is impossible to determine.
207. See, e.g., supra note 202.
208. Id. Representative Thomas Ewing (R-Illinois) suggested that the funds for
worker retraining come, instead, from cuts to the food stamp program. Id-
209. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 126, at 723.
210. Id. at 723; Alan F. Holmer &Judith H. Bello, TheFast Track Debate: A Prescription
for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L LAw. 183, 184 (1992). Fast track is the last in a long line of
efforts that attempt to find a balance between the need for Congressional oversight in
trade matters and the need to control Congress' protectionist impulses as displayed by
the Smoot-Hawley tariff fiasco. See I.M. DEsruR, AmmcAN TRADE PoLrrcs 32-33 (2d
ed. 1992).
211. See Koh, supra note 87, at 168.
212. While this article does not address reforms to domestic U.S. trade procedures
and policies, this author wishes to emphasize that the cure to correcting the flaws of fast
track is to substantially amend the process, not to reject it.
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time Congress can consider a trade agreement's implementing legisla-
tion,213 restrict the time that Congress may debate the legislation, 214 con-
strain the number of committees that can exercise jurisdiction over the
agreement,215  and prohibit amendments to the implementing
legislation.216
In addition, because, in a technical sense, only the president sends a
trade agreement to Congress--even though a host of agencies may have
expended countless hours negotiating a final agreement-the fast track
procedures have been held to include no final agency action. The
absence of a final agency action prevents the triggering of the Administra-
tive Procedures Act, which prevents the use of judicial review by citizens
seeking the application of, among other things, the participatory require-
ments as environmental assessments under the National Environmental
Policy Act.
By facilitating the passage of these sweeping secretive trade agree-
ments, fast track also facilitates the passage of internationally negotiated
changes to domestic laws--changes that could not be arrived at through
normal legislative process.217 For example, despite the Bush and Clinton
administrations' claims that the NAIFTA would not require the United
States to compromise its existing environmental, health, and safety laws,
the NAIFTA implementing legislation did precisely that-it lowered certain
U.S. standards. Under the NAFTA Implementation Act the United States
amended a series of its food inspection laws to ease the entry of foodstuffs
from Mexico and Canada. 218 These amendments have diminished the
degree of confidence U.S. citizens may rightfully have in the notion that
the foods they eat are safe.219 Still another provision of the NAFTA Imple-
mentation Act changed the way in which the United States calculates the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE) for automobiles
213. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191(e) (1988); Goldman, supra note 10; Sim, supra note 195,
at 499.
214. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191(f) (2), 219 1(g) (2); Goldman, supra note 10; Sim, supra
note 195, at 504.
215. See Goldman, supra note 10; Sim, supra note 195, at 498;John H.Jackson, United
States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, in IMPLEMENTING THE ToKYo
ROUND: NATIONAL CONsTrrU-roNs AND INTERNAToNAL ECONOMIC RULES 139, 163
(1984).
216. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191(d); see also Goldman, supra note 10. While it is true that the
fast track procedures are merely internal rules of procedure that may be changed, the
procedures for changing these rules make a withdrawal of fast track difficult if not
impossible.
217. See Koh, supra note 87, at 171.
218. See Goldman, supra note 10; NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,
§ 361(b), (e), (f), 107 Stat. 2057, 2122-24 (1993).
219. See USTR Draft Reveals Intention to Implement GATT Dispute Panels, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 4, 1994, at S1, S2. Given that the Clinton administration has already
expressed its intent to use the Final Agreement's implementing legislation to expand
these NAFTA changes to embrace similar products from all Parties, the extent of this
diminution is likely to increase exponentially. Id. at S1.
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originating from Mexico.220
The food safety and CAFE examples reflect the danger present here.
Neither of these changes were subject to informed public or Congres-
sional debate because they were the products of secret negotiations, which
were then buried away in voluminous sleep-inducing texts, that were only
provided to Congress and the public at the eleventh hour. These exam-
ples also demonstrate that the power of international trade decision-mak-
ing processes over democratic domestic political processes is substantial; it
is hard to imagine that at that time the United States Congress under any
other circumstances would have lowered U.S. food safety or air pollution
prevention standards.
Moreover, not all changes to domestic protections dealt away in
closed international trade negotiations receive even Congressional scru-
tiny. Many of these changes are made by agencies through what they per-
ceive as an appropriate level of discretion regarding the implemention of
a given piece of legislation.221 In addition, such trade-driven changes to
the way laws are implemented frustrate the Congressional purpose behind
the law in question. For instance, in December of 1993, the U.S. EPA
promulgated regulations under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments for
reformulated gasoline.2 22 These regulations imposed more stringent cer-
tification information requirements on foreign importers of gasoline than
they imposed on domestic gasoline producers.2 23 Venezuela argued that
this rule discriminated against their gasoline products and requested
GATT consultations with the United States.2 24 As a result of these consul-
tations the United States agreed to change the reformulated gasoline rules
in order to remove the perceived discrimination.22 5 Environmentalists
believed that this change in policy would allow for the sale of dirtier Vene-
zuelan gas in the United States, which, in turn, would cause increased
levels of airborne toxins and smog build up.226 Had Congress not been
able to halt funding for the EPA program, as modified for trade concerns,
the EPA would have directly contradicted the Congressional purpose of
the reformulated gasoline requirements. 22 7 Subsequently, in order to
220. See Goldman, supra note 10; NAFrA Implementation Act, § 371; 15 U.S.C.
§ 2003 (b) (2) (1988); Revisions to CAFE Calculations Pursuant to the NAFTA Implementation
Act of 1993, 59 Fed. Reg. 677 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 600).
221. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984) (discussing the high degree of deference provided to regulatory agen-
cies in implementing statutes).
222. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,416 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
223. See Michael Bergsman, EPA to Change Clean Air Rule to Ward Off Threatened GAT
Challenge INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 25, 1994, at 1, 13-14.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 14.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1) (Supp. V 1993). Section 7545(k) (1) provides that
the goal of the reformulated gasoline requirements is to achieve:
the greatest reduction in emissions of ozone forming volatile organic com-
pounds.., and emissions of toxic air pollutants... achievable... taking into
consideration the cost of achieving such emission reductions, any nonair-qual-
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avoid the frustration of its purpose, Congress was forced to take the
extreme step of prohibiting the use of funds for the EPA's modified
program. 228
While trade negotiations use closed door means to force actual
changes in domestic laws, trade challenges use economic and political lev-
erage to reach the same goal. Trade panels cannot force a losing party in
a dispute to alter its domestic laws. Instead, victorious parties are permit-
ted to exact costly concessions or to use coercive trade sanctions in order
to raise the stakes of maintaining a democratically enacted law. Raising
the stakes often compels the losing party to change their GATT-offensive
laws or practices.229 If a domestic law is only slightly trade-intrusive, then
paying for some social protection, like an antitrust, labor, health, or envi-
ronmental law is not an onerous burden. However, where the law in ques-
tion is highly trade-intrusive, the costs of protecting one's citizens may
begin to mount up. Legislators who never dreamed that they would have
to pay to protect their constituents from social, environmental, health, or
safety threats, are confronted with the bill-literally and figuratively-for
the domestic protections they have enacted. These legislators are forced
to make a choice between paying to preserve the current social protec-
tions or minimizing expenditures by eliminating the protection. 230 By
forcing Congressional members to make choices that, absent some trade
agreement, they would not be confronted with, the decisions of undemo-
cratic trade panels make it more difficult for democratic legislators to pro-
ity and other air-quality related health and environmental impacts and energy
requirements.
1.L
228. See House Approves Report on EPA Budget, Blocks EPA Rule on Imported Gasoline,
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), Sept. 16, 1994, at 985.
229. SeeJohn H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1227, 1257, n.70. In a large number of recent cases
the United States has "revised its legislation or other measures in order to comply with
[a] GATT panel report." Id. (citing GATT, United States-Customs User Fe4 Doc. L/6264
(Feb. 2, 1988), BISD 35th Supp. 245; United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain
Imported Substances, Doc. L/6175 (June 17, 1987), BISD 34th Supp. 136; GATT, United
States-Tax Legislation (DISC), Doc. L/4422 (Nov. 12, 1976) BISD 23rd Supp. 98).
230. Even when a country is not persuaded by costly concessions or coercive retalia-
tory measures to make changes in its laws, the substance of a contentious panel decision
can find its way into future trade agreements. Once the logic of a panel decision
becomes part of one of these massive package deals, the changes that were previously
rejected are oftentimes made.
For example, as part of the implementing legislation for the Final Agreement, the
Clinton administration intends to implement two highly contentious panel decisions
that the United States has heretofore refused to change its laws to comply with. See
USTR Draft Reveals Intention to Implement GATP Dispute Panels, supra note 219, at S1. The
first panel decision called for the United States to "eliminate a preferential excise tax
for small producers of beer and wine .... ." Id. The second panel decision called for
changes to section 337 border protections against products that infringe on intellectual
property rights. Id. Whether or not these decisions have merit, the fact is that the
United States, which had refused to implement them, did so as part of the Uruguay
Round deal.
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tect their constituents.2 3 '
Moreover, in addition to requiring legislators to rethink protections
that have already passed democratic muster, both trade rules and panel
decisions also constrain democracy by the chilling effect they have on new
laws and regulations. Regressives in any national government can squelch
virtually any new law or regulation by claiming that the law or regulation
conflicts in some way with a trade rule or policy. For example, during the
1994 deficit reduction legislation, the Clinton administration proposed a
British Thermal Unit (BTU) energy tax. In killing the proposed BTU tax,
opponents relied heavily on the argument that this tax would violate the
GATT. Certainly opposition to the BTU tax was really grounded in the
economic self-interests of the opponents. However, the specter of a trade
problem provided the opponents with a tool to hammer away at the Clin-
ton proposal. A similar fate almost befell the Wild Bird Conservation
Act.23 2
B. Effects on a Democratic Executive Branch
Some will undoubtedly find the above discussion of the undemocratic
effects of international trade decision-making on congressional bodies
ironic at best. These individuals believe, at times rightly, that the U.S.
Congress, particularly in matters of international trade, does not serve the
interests of the general public. Instead they believe that narrow special
interest groups control Congress and drive trade policy, generally in a pro-
tectionist direction.2 33 Their arguments are not without merit. Propo-
nents of the "captured Congress" school of thinking argue that providing
to Congress a greater role in trade policy will undermine, not strengthen,
democracy. Many of these individuals believe that granting greater con-
trol to the centralized executive, which can act more easily in the overall
national interest, will lead to the democratization of trade. Even propo-
nents of the "captured Congress" school of thinking should, however, be
distressed by the effects of undemocratic international trade decision-mak-
ing on democratic executives.
231. See, e.g., Clinton Energy Tax Staggers into Senate, ENERGY EcoN. & CLIMATE CHANcE
(1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; W. Lynn Garner, Clinton Adminis-
tration to Shift BTU Tax from Oil to Products, OIL DAILY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
232. Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992, 16 U.S.C. § 4901 (Supp. V 1993). See Letter
from Defenders of Wildlife et al. to Ambassador Carla Hills, United States Trade Repre-
sentative, 1-4 (Apr. 3, 1992) (on file with author) ("We understand your office has
expressed concern that the proposed Department of the Interior legislation might be
in direct conflict with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and that
this has effectively stopped the release of the proposed bill from the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget.").
233. Cf JAMsEs BovARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 272-300 (1991); Anderson & Silver-
stein, supra note 202, at 752 (reciting list of 19 NAFTA deals). While it is easy to blame
President Clinton for complicity in the NAFTA deal-making, much of the blame does
fall upon the Congressional members who, in deciding what issues would determine
their votes, opted for pork for their contributors and their districts.
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As the BTU tax example reflects, although the constraining effects of
these trade agreements are most pronounced with regard to the legislative
branch, this need not always be the case. The concentration of conse-
quences on the legislative branch is due largely to the fact that both the
Clinton and Bush administrations have been supportive of both the GATT
and the NAFTA and have gone to great lengths to avoid conflicts between
the terms of these agreements and their policies. 23 4 It is, however, possi-
ble that a future president, who unlike his predecessors had no part in the
negotiation of either the GATT or the NAFTA, might want to take a more
aggressive approach to international human rights, labor, or environmen-
tal concerns. Because trade measures are one of the few tools available to
encourage other countries to alter their policies, it is not unlikely that
such a proactive presidential program might run afoul of either GATT or
NAFTA rules.
While the executive's ability to participate in both international trade
decision-making and trade disputes limits, to a certain degree, the anti-
democratic constraints on his or her ability to effect the programs desired
by his or her electorate, it does not do away with them. For example,
while democratic executives can participate in the conduct of trade dis-
putes, the interested parties that they represent cannot. This hurts the
strength of the executives' case. By way of analogy, amid that write in sup-
port of the government's position in U.S. federal court cases do so to bol-
ster the arguments of the government and to show broad support for the
government's position. If such amid could no longer voice their opinions
to the courts, then the government's case would be weakened. The closed
door nature of trade disputes thus harms the actions of democratic
executives.
Moreover, the fact that a democratic executive participates in
undemocratic disputes does not alleviate the undemocratic effect that a
dispute panel can have on the executive's ability to conduct the policies
and programs that his or her constituents want. For example, assume that
in the year 2000 a new president sweeps into office riding a wave of con-
cern over the fate of the middle class American worker. Upon taking
office, this President introduces and obtains passage of legislation
designed to protect American workers that may have a substantial effect
on international trade flows. Assume also that the 2000 election was essen-
tially a referendum on the plight of the American worker and that the
proposal for this legislation was the centerpiece of the President's election
campaign. Following the mandate provided by the American public, the
newly elected President implements the legislation in a way that is most
protective to workers but also most disruptive to trade. She is immediately
confronted with a GATT or NAFTA challenge by another party to one of
these agreements. The new President must then defend her democrati-
cally-enacted year 2000 labor program under the rules of these preceding
trade agreements that were crafted by previous executives without suffi-
234. See Bergsman, supra note 223.
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cient direct public participation or transparency. This defense, assuming
that by the year 2000 no changes have been made to existing GAIT or
NAFTA rules against democratic participation, will occur without public
participation or access to information. If the panel decides against the
President's labor program, then the President will have to choose from
one of three options: 1) go to Congress and ask them to repeal the law
that was the centerpiece of her election campaign, 2) consistent with the
underlying legislation, change the implementation of the law to make it as
consistent as possible with trade rules, and/or 3) pay by way of concessions
or sanctions for any continuing inconsistencies between the trade rules
and the program. Regardless of the President's final decision as to how to
reply to the panel's findings, it is clear that the President is severely con-
strained by decisions made in undemocratic international trade fora.
C. Effects on Democratic Sub-federal Governments
The constraints of international trade decision-making on democratic gov-
ernance exist not only at the federal level, but also at the sub-federal
level. 23 5 Even though sub-federal governments-localities, states, and
provinces-are not included in either trade negotiations or disputes, they
are through their federal governments bound by these agreements and
decisions.23 6 The imposition of trade rules and decisions on sub-federal
governments can constrain democracy even at the local level. For exam-
ple, as part of the NAFTA deal, but well before any legislation was brought
before the U.S. Congress, the Administrator of the U.S. Federal Highway
Administration issued a final rule preempting states from requiring or
issuing state drivers licenses to Mexican commercial drivers operating in
the United States.23 7 This federal rule removed from the states the tradi-
tional police power of using licensing requirements to ensure the health
and safety of their citizens.
D. The Trade Justifications Against More Democratic Procedures
Those who wish to maintain undemocratic trade decision-making
processes argue that the nature of international trade negotiations
requires that governments restrict documents and conduct negotiations
behind closed doors; governments must be able to keep their positions
confidential and they must be free to negotiate candidly otherwise it will
be impossible to reach agreement.2 38 Most importantly proponents of
secrecy argue that openness and participation will subject trade negotia-
235. See Kenneth J. Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with Interna-
tional Trade Agreements at the State Level 2 MIN. J. GLoBAL TRADz 143 (1993).
236. I&
237. See Commercial Driver's License Reciprocity with Mexico, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,454 (1992)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 383). This rule was issued in final form without any
notice and comment period. Id.
238. See DANIEL Esm, GREENING THE GATT 36 (1994). Professor Esty provides,
"[Trade negotiators] are comfortable with the diplomatic practice of working in secret
... particularly since they understand that trade liberalization produces diffuse benefits
... that may fail to rouse significant public support in the face of special interests." Id.
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tions to capture by protectionist interests. Similar justifications are
advanced for trade dispute processes; because trade disputes have tradi-
tionally been less adjudicative and more negotiative, these disputes must
similarly be insulated.2 39
These rationales and the fears upon which they are founded are, how-
ever, overstated.2 40 While a certain degree of secrecy is needed in virtually
all negotiations, substantial middle ground exists that would allow demo-
cratic transparency in international trade negotiations without compro-
mising the ability of the negotiations to reach successful conclusions. 241
Additionally, the captive argument fails to recognize that, through the
resources available to them, those who wish to advance protectionist eco-
nomic self-interests already have greater access to and participate, albeit
still indirectly, more fully in these negotiations. Rather than preventing
protectionism, secrecy allows for the inequitable status quo that at times
favors the continuation of protectionism-protectionist players are
already essentially in the room and the closed door just prevents others
from entering.2 42
The rationales for undemocratic dispute resolution are even more
vacuous. The trend in trade dispute resolution, as reflected by the Final
Agreement, is increasingly towards adjudicative processes. As this trend
continues, the need for secrecy in dispute resolution sharply diminishes.
Further, as with trade negotiations, the availability of simple middle
ground approaches to democratization reflects the notion that trade dis-
pute processes need not be so closed.243 In fact, the only real rationale for
the closed nature of trade decision-making is tradition; that is how it has
always been done, and resistance to change is always present.
239. SeeJoint Answer to Written Questions Nos. 1644/92 to 1647/92 and 1649/92
given by Sir Leon Brittan on behalf of the Commission (29 July 1993), 1993 O.J. (C
333) 3, 4 ("The Commission does not agree that the GATT dispute-settlement system is
characterized by its secrecy. An alternative system under which private parties had
direct access to GATT dispute settlement would be administratively unworkable and,
more importantly, fundamentally change the inter-governmental nature of the
GATT.").
240. See Daniel C. Esty, Toward a Greener GATT, Irr'L ECON. IasiGHrs, Mar./Apr.
1994, at 17, 20. Perhaps the most accurate justification for the GATI"s undemocratic
ways is tradition. Following the demise of the International Trade Organization-
GATT's failed precursor--GATT supporters surmised that the way for a stronger GATT
to evolve was through "low visibility." See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GAIT LEGAL Sysr EM
AND WoRLD TRADE DiPLomA .c 55 (1975). It is possible, if not likely, that the GATT's
current secrecy results from the continuation of this belief as entrenched tradition.
241. See Esty, supra note 240, at 20.
242. Cf Michael Wines, For New Lobbyists, It's Now What They Know, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 3,
1993, at B14. Industries seeking special trade consideration have relied on former
senior government trade officials to gain inside access to knowledge and people.
243. See Esty, supra note 240, at 20.
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IV. A Prescription for Democratizing International Trade Decision-
making
The detrimental effects of international trade decision-making on democ-
racy, however, require that the entropy of tradition must be overcome.
Trade decision-making must be democratized. The following are nonex-
clusive suggestions for how this democratization can begin.
244
A. Democratizing Trade Negotiations
Providing greater participation in trade discussions and negotiations
presents the greatest challenge in the democratization of trade decision-
making. In democratizing trade negotiations, the substantial need for par-
ticipation must be balanced with both the recognition that states will
remain the principal actors in trade negotiations and the understanding
that a certain degree of confidentiality is necessary in these negotiations.
Notwithstanding the difficulty in striking the proper balance, a number of
simple democratic advances can be imparted without undermining the
trade decision-making system.
2 45
First and foremost, citizens and NGOs should receive full observer
status at trade negotiations and at the meetings of trade organizations,
such as the OECD and the GATT. Observer status should also provide for
the participation of interested NGOs and citizens, not just at the plenary
level but also at the committee level, including both expert and working
groups. In general, observer status should also accord citizens and NGOs
the right to make interventions in support of their positions. The proce-
dures of Codex discussed above provide one model for how observer sta-
tus could be effectuated. An alternative model can be found in the
workings of the ILO, which includes NGO members as part of each
nation's official delegation. 246 The adoption of the Codex model here
would, however, have to address the other participatory flaws that plague
Codex.247 The involvement of NGOs in the Eighth Conference of the
Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Flora and Fauna and in the ILO demonstrates that NGO participa-
tion is not only possible but can be beneficial. 248 While allowing private
parties to serve as observers may push certain discussions into smaller
more private sessions, this effect is outweighed by the value of the partici-
pation and transparency observer status would provide. The adoption of
244. These recommendations are focused on democratizing international trade deci-
sion-making. For an excellent discussion of means to democratize domestic trade deci-
sion-making in the United States, see Goldman, supra note 10.
245. SeeJackson, supra note 58, at 234.
246. See supra note 35.
247. See supra part II.B.2.
248. See Chris Wold, Discovering the Limits of Democracy in International Law, 12 Anvoc.
7, 8-11 (1992). Despite the fact that numerous hurdles were erected to prevent Mr.
Wold from participating in the CITES negotiations, his participation ultimately played a
significant role in the final agreements that were crafted. See id. Mr. Wold's participa-
tion, most notably, assisted the parties to remain in compliance with the underlying
CITES agreement. See id.
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the ILO model, which allows NGO representatives as members of delega-
tions,24 9 may address this problem by ensuring participation, albeit more
limited participation, even within these smaller discussions.
In addition to observer status, social interests must also be further
integrated into the work of organizations like OECD and Codex. Within
the OECD structure, social interest NGOs must apply for and receive con-
sultative status. Here one can imagine the OECD's list of consultative
NGOs being augmented by human rights, environmental, development,
and consumer groups. Similarly, changes are required within Codex
membership. The membership of Codex delegations must be rebalanced
by adding consumer and environmental groups within the participating
country delegations.2 50
Additionally, documents that are widely circulated within these trade
fora should be made public in a timely manner. This rule of public availa-
bility should apply not only to reports, but also to negotiating texts. Inter-
national trade organizations and countries should be allowed a certain
degree of leeway to keep draft proposals and texts confidential. However,
once a proposal or text is circulated to the general membership, it should
also be made available to the general public. The rules for access to docu-
ments should provide a limited, narrowly-tailored exception for protecting
information that is proprietary or could endanger national security. Such
a provision should, wherever possible, favor redaction of protected infor-
mation over blanket protection for documents.
Lastly, all procedures should be transparent; they should be based on
publicly available, pre-established rules, that are equally applied to all
interests. As part of this strategy of transparency, a period of notice and
comment should be provided prior to the adoption of any policy.25'
Absent such a commitment to transparency, any participatory advances
are easily circumvented or arbitrarily applied.
B. Democratizing Trade Dispute Resolution
Trade disputes must also be democratized. The proposals set out below
assume that the trend in trade dispute settlement will continue to be away
from negotiations and towards more judicial settlements. Thus, these
reforms focus on providing the public the same forms of access that they
enjoy in other judicial settings within trade dispute resolution. 252
In order to allow citizens to monitor both the actions of international
trade bodies, such as the newly created WTO, and of their national gov-
ernments, citizens should be allowed full access to all the pleadings and
249. See supra note 35.
250. International Consumer Unions Report, supra note 116, at 1, 3.
251. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 76, at 96.
252. At least one commentator has proposed, in the alternative, that democratic
reforms of trade dispute settlement occur within the context of negotiated settlements.
See id. at 96-98.
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other documents filed in trade disputes.2 53 These documents should be
made publicly available at the time of their filing with the panel. Excep-
tions to this rule of access should be made only where necessary to protect
national security or the confidentiality of proprietary information. Here
again, this exception should be narrowly tailored and should favor redac-
tion over exclusion.
Similarly, citizens should have the right to attend all hearings of a
sitting trade panel.2 54 Panels should have limited discretion to hold pri-
vate sessions to protect the national security of a party and to preserve the
confidentiality of proprietary information. Settlement negotiations could
still be conducted in private. However, if a negotiated conclusion is
agreed upon, it should have to be filed with the panel and made public.
Similarly, final reports of a panel, along with any supporting documents
should be made available to the public without delay.2 55 The publication
of decisions of international tribunals is already well established in both
the International Court ofJustice (ICJ)m 6 and the European Court ofJus-
tice.257 There is no reason why the substance of trade disputes should
deserve more secretive treatment than that provided to the delicate and
contentious international matters taken up, for example, by the ICJ.258
Additionally, interested citizens and NGOs should also be provided
with the right to submit amicus curiae briefs to trade panels.25 9 These
briefs would provide panels with important supplementary information
that may not, for political or other reasons, be reflected in the briefs of the
parties. Opponents of allowing private parties to submit amicus briefs fear
that trade panels will be inundated by worthless documents that will pre-
vent them from giving proper consideration to the briefs of the actual
parties to disputes. This fear that trade panels are incapable of separating
the wheat from the chaff seems odd coming from the very individuals who
trust trade panels with cases involving huge dollar amounts that hinge on
the application of trade rules to complex domestic laws and policies. In
fact, amicus briefs would not substantially impair the workings of interna-
253. See Robert F. Housman & DurvoodJ. Zaelke, Making Trade and Environmental
Policies Mutually Reinforcing. Forging Competitive Sustainability, 23 EVrrL. L. 545, 570
(1993); Esty, supra note 240, at 17, 18.
254. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 253, at 570.
255. It would, however, be proper for reports to be provided to the parties to a dis-
pute prior to making them public in order to allow the parties time to prepare for their
publication. This delay should, however, not be longer than one day.
256. See, e.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and Montenegro)),
1993 I.C.J. 3 (April 8); see also Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldem, Changes in the Publication of
L C.J. Reports: Effects of These Suggestions on Teaching International Law, 10 MjcH.J. INT'L L
679, 679-80 (1989).
257. See, e.g., The Proceedings of the Court ofJustice and Court of Frmst Instance of the Euro-
pean Communities, Week of 18 to 22 May 1992, No. 15/92.
258. SeeJ. Patrick Kelly, The Changing Process of International Law and the Role of the
World Court, 11 MxCH. J. INT'L L. 129, 137 (1989) (discussing thirteen cases involving
state use of military force); see also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 256, at 3.
259. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 76, at 96.
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tional trade dispute panels. The United States Supreme Court, which
hears far more cases in a given year than any trade panel, receives count-
less amicus briefs and this does not detract in any way from the Court's
ability to give proper consideration to both the arguments of the parties
and the information provided by amici. Still drawing from the U.S. federal
system for amicus participation, another way to prevent panels from being
inundated with information would be to provide panels with the ability to
require that amid with similar positions must consolidate their briefs.
The reforms above attempt to develop more participatory trade dis-
pute settlement mechanisms that preserve the basic framework of tradi-
tional trade dispute settlement. Other types of trade dispute settlement
are rapidly emerging in international fora, which provide alternative mod-
els for how to provide the global public with greater democracy in trade
disputes. Two such alternative trade dispute models developed in the
NAFTA are worth noting. First, with regard to holders of intellectual
property rights, the NAFTA provides that the first means for settling trade
disputes regarding intellectual property rights shall be in the domestic
courts of the NAFTA parties.260 Second, with regard to the NAFTA invest-
ment disputes, the first means provided to settle such disputes is binding
arbitration between the aggrieved private investor and the NAFTA party in
question.26 ' Similar alternative forms of trade dispute settlement mecha-
nisms might provide the means necessary to democratize other forms of
trade disputes.26 2
Conclusion
In this era of economic belt tightening, international trade agreements
hold considerable sway over the domestic policies of nations. The
strength of these agreements can be an important tool to encourage the
growth of democracy internationally. However, in their current form, the
institutions and agreements of international trade not only fail to export
democracy around the globe, but also undercut the exercise of democratic
governance in nations that are currently democratic in nature. These
threats to democracy must be corrected. The rules of international trade
decision-making must be changed to incorporate basic elements of demo-
cratic governance, namely the rights of citizens to have access to these
decision-making fora and to participate in decisions that affect their inter-
ests. These changes must take care not to undermine the efficacy of the
international trade decision-making bodies. However, substantial middle
ground exists for changes that will provide greater democratic rights, yet
not endanger the strengths of these institutions and agreements. In order
for international trade decision-making to further and not inhibit democ-
racy, as well as to preserve its legitimacy among the citizenry of the world,
260. See NAFMA, supra note 125, arts. 1714-15.
261. See id. arts. 1116-18.
262. See Housman & Zaelke, supra note 253, at 570-71.
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basic democratic changes to international trade decision-making can and
must be made in short order.

